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CHAPTER I 
THE PROBLEM OF POLITICAL CHANGE IN 
DEVELOPING SOCIETIES 
The World Since World War II 
The world since the end of World War II has seen the 
struggle for independence by many of the former colonial states of 
Africa, Asia, and Latin America. At the time of this writing, over 
sixty previously dependent states have achieved sovereignty since 
1945. 1 Today, one must look closely to find the last vestiges of the 
great colonial empires. Yet, with independence the leaders of these 
new states are confronted with many pressing problems that heretofore 
had been handled by the bureaucratic institutions of the colonial power. 
These problems range from simply being able to provide basic 
services to larger considerations such as the development of a 
national foreign policy. Fundamental to these problems is a larger, 
more central issue, that of establishing a peaceful, orderly method 
of transferring political authority and its accompanying aura of 
legitimacy from one group in society to another. It is an issue of 
1 William G. Andrews and Uri Ra'anan, The Politics of the 
coup d'etat (New York: Van Nostrand Reinhold Company, 1970), p. 1. 
1 
-crucial importance that the leadership must face if the new state is to 
survive its first pangs of political development. 
Indonesia: A Typical Developing Society 
2 
For the purposes of this paper, a developing society may be 
viewed as a transitional stage in the evolution of a modern developed 
industrialized state. Whereas a traditional society is based on a 
sacred value system, manifested by an emphasis on custom and 
tradition, a subsistance peasant economy, and a restrictive political 
process and a modern society is one based on a predominately secular 
value orientation with its accompanying emphasis on modern (i.e., 
western) economic and political institutions, a transitional society is 
an environment in which the clash between sacred and secular has not 
yet been resolved. It is a society in which the pull of the past as well 
as that of the future is still strong. Thus, a developing society is an 
environment of inherent conflict. If the lure of modernity is strong 
enough, the developing society will eventually evolve into a modern one. 
This drilt toward modernity is by no means assured, however. It is 
entirely possible that the ties to the past (traditional society) will be 
strong enough to prevent any modernizing movement to develop. The 
challenge for the leadership in such societies is to find a way to create 
the best possible environment for their citizens while at the same time 
reconciling the conflict between the two competing value systems. 
.... 
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In many regards, Indonesia is a typical developing society. 
A state of 120 mi. ll ion inhabitants spread over 700, 000 square miles, 
Indonesia was first brought into contact with the West by the Portugese 
in 1511. The area came under Dutch hegemony in the early 1600's 
when they supplanted the Portugese as the leading European power in 
sea-girt Southeast Asia. The Dutch ruled Indonesia for more than 
three centuries. Her rule was abruptly terminated in 1942 when 
Japan seized control of the islands, driving the Dutch from the area. 
Japanese control of the islands was short-lived, ending with her 
defeat i.n World War II. Of major significance, however, was the fact 
that during the latter stages of the Japanese occupation the military 
governor summarily granted independence to Indonesia through a 
native nationalist movement headed by the future president of Indonesia, 
Sukarno. This action was to take on added significance later when the 
Dutch attempted to re-assert their influence in the area following 
World War II. To the Dutch, the grant of independence made by the 
Japanese was invalid because the Japanese had seized the area i.n 
violation of international law. The stage was therefore set for a crisis 
i.n political change that was not resolved until December 1949 when the 
Dutch, realizing the futility of their efforts, formally ceded sovereignty 
to the Indonesians. In August 1950, the unitary Republic of Indonesia, 
with a western-style parliamentary system was proclaimed. 
jiLi2 
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The hi.story of Indonesia i.n the 1950's and early 1960's i.s the 
story of the failure of western democratic tradi.ti.ons and the growing 
concentration of poli.ti.cal power i.n the hands of one man, President 
Sukarno. This pattern of growing authori.tari.ani.sm was only checked 
by the events of September 30 - October 1 , 1965. These events and the 
resulting cri.si.s i.n poli.ti.cal change form the bases of thi.s research. 
As Luci.en Pye has pointed out, i.n non-western soci.eti.es the 
poli.ti.cal sphere i.s o~-ti.mes not sharply di.fferenti.ated from the social 
and cultural environment. 2 That i.s to say, many of the actions and 
values of the political leadership i.n developing societies are shaped by 
the socio-cultural environment out of which the political culture evolved. 
Issues i.n the political sector may well be influenced by social confi.gu-
rations permeating all aspects of life. Thus, the concept of poli.ti.cal 
change may be greatly affected by factors not manifestly related to the 
poli.ti.cal process, but profoundly controlling i.t just the same. 
Such i.s the case i.n Indonesia. Indonesian society i.s 
centered around the mystical values and rituals derived from the 
ancient Javanese culture. Certain cultural traits stand out i.n this 
respect -- the fear of shame (loss of public esteem), conformity 
ori.entati.on, and hi.erarchi.cal deference to i.ndi.viduals i.n posi.ti.ons of 
2Lucien Pye, Southeast Asia's Poli.ti.cal Systems 
(Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1967), vi.i.. 
pt 
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authority. Underlying all of Javanese society is the penchant for 
misdirection or the desire to confront any problem obliquely rather 
than in a direct manner. It ts the contention of this research that this 
typically Javanese reaction of misdirection (manifested artistically in 
the classical Javanese art form, the wayang kulit or shadow play) was 
employed by both contending parties in attempts to resolve the crisis in 
political change that occurred as a result of the events of GESTAPU. 3 
Purposes 
Several ends are sought in this thesis. First, it is intended 
to serve as an introduction to Indonesia, a state that has the potential 
to become a major Southeast Asian and world power. By exploring 
the roots of contemporary Indonesia, it is hoped that the reader will 
gain an insight into a diverse, complex society that is sure to take on 
added significance in the last quarter of the twentieth century. 
Going beyond a cursory examination of Indonesian society, 
however, this paper will also focus on a crucial relationship that exists 
in any of the new states in the world today; namely, the institutional 
role of the military in the political decision-making process. In 
developed (i.e., western) states there has been a long tradition of 
non-participation by the military in matters political. Historically, 
3An acronym usually used to denote the attempted coup of 
September 30 - October 1 , 1 965. 
... 
this function has been reserved for the political institutions (political 
parties, politicians, bureaucracies) in that society. In developing 
societies, however, this generally has not been the case. Created 
as a defensive institution by the colonial power, the military in a 
developing society has generally received favored treatment in terms 
of educational opportunities and budgetary considerations. Thus, 
under the colonial administration the military institutions were often 
stronger and more modern than any other institutions in society, 
particularly the political ones. A basic source of conflict is thereby 
established. 
6 
When the time for independence comes, the political leaders, 
by the very nature of their activities, feel that the legitimacy to govern 
should automatically devolve to them. The military leaders, on the 
other hand, long accustomed to playing a dominant role in society, 
feel otherwise; namely, that they, as the protectors of society, should 
wield the predominant influence. This feeling on the part of the 
military may be reinforced especially if the military was called upon 
by the political institutions to aid them in the struggles for inde-
pendence. This was exactly the case in Indonesia in the late 1940's 
as Sukarno and his PNI associates negotiated Indonesia's independence 
at the conference table while General Nasuti.on was winning it in the 
jungles of Central Java against the Dutch. The point to be made is 
this: in developing societies, the military has become enmeshed in 
p 
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the political process. Because of the role it played in winning the 
independence, military men have tended to believe that they should 
have a predominant voice in the political decision-making process. 
Politicians, on the other hand, feel that military men lack the finesse 
and expertise necessary in politics. Yet the desires of the military 
must somehow be accommodated. If their desire is blunted, a crisis 
in political leadership may occur. By tracing the role of the military 
in pre-1965 Indonesian society, this research will isolate the factors 
that led the military to intervene in the political decision-making 
process in March, 1967. It will serve as a· model of mi.litary-civi.lian 
relationships and identify the variables that may disturb the precarious 
balance between the two. It is hoped that this thesis wi 11 generate valid 
general izati.ons that can be utilized in a broader comparative study of 
the role of the military in developing societies. 
There is another, larger question to which this thesis will 
ultimately address itself. It is intended to be an examination of the 
concept of political change in a developing society. Institutionalized 
political change is a key characteristic of a mature political system. 
This was not the case in Indonesia during the period 1965 - 1967. 
Indeed, upwards of one mi. lli.on people lost their lives i.n the blood-
letting that followed the abortive 1965 coup attempt. It was at this 
juncture that the military felt compelled to enter the political arena. 
p 
The purpose of this thesis is to explore the manner in which this 
crisis in political change was resolved. 
An integral component in the Indonesian experience was the 
trials of suspected communist politicians and military men that took 
place in the wake of the abortive coup attempt. Each defendant was 
selected because of his alleged proclivity for communist ideals and 
8 
also because of his relationship to the head of state, President Sukarno. 
Operating in typically Javanese fashion, the military used these trials 
to displace the civilian authorities by undermining their bases of 
support in society. By focusing on the trials to illustrate their central 
role in the resolution of the crisis in political change that threatened 
to destroy Indonesia during 1965 - 1967, it is hoped that this thesis will 
aid in the understanding of the problems of developing societies, 
particularly in the area of political change. It is a subject that must 
be considered if the gap between the developed and developing societies 
is ever to be bridged. 
Methodology 
To this end, the following methodological construct is 
proposed: the roots of the coup attempt will be explored with an eye 
toward identifying the factors that prompted the confrontation; the 
events of the coup will be analyzed, providing a background necessary 
for a competent understanding of the trials; the trials of three 
p 
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prominent Sukarno subordinates will be examined to show how the 
verdicts were virtually assured by the political climate of the times. 
Finally, the trials will be placed 'into the context of the m'ilitary's 
strategy for the displacement of Sukarno. Comments on the signif-
icance of the trials as regards a model of political change 'in developing 
societies will conclude the paper. 
CHAPTER II 
THE ACTORS 
By the mtd-1960's, two factors were becoming increasingly 
apparent to students of the Indonesian political scene. The first was 
that President Sukarno was the dominant personality in Indonesia's 
somewhat chaotic political situation, dwarfing any potential rivals. 
Second, it was clear that Sukarno was able to maintain himself in 
power through the delicate manipulation of the only two institutions 
in society that could potentially challenge him; the military and the 
Communist Party of Indonesia. 4 This chapter will look briefly at the 
evolution of these factors with an eye toward ascertaining the motives 
that prompted the crisis in political leadership that occurred on the 
night of September 30 - October 1 , 1965. 
The Military 
Historically, the military of Indonesia has played an 
important role in the development of the Indonesian nation-state. 
The People's Security Army, founded in October, 1945, was the 
4 Henceforth, the Communist Party of Indonesia will be 
referred to as the PKI. 
10 
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fore-runner of the modern Armed Forces of the Republic of Indonesia. 
It was the People's Security Army that waged the guerrilla campaign 
against the Dutch after World War II. Thus, from its very inception, 
the Indonesian military had played an integral part in the political 
decision-making process. Many military men felt that, because they 
had fought for the state, they were entitled to a predominant voice in 
state affairs. 
The source of the officer corps in the Indonesian military is 
varied. Many of the officers received their training from the Japanese 
during the occupation period. Other future officers were trained 
overseas by the Dutch at the .Dutch Military Academy at Breda, the 
Netherlands. Sti. ll other future officers served in the independent 
"lascar" units that operated against the Dutch or were recruited from 
the student army that developed in response to the occupation period. 
Generally speaking, the officers who began their careers in the years 
of struggle against the Dutch were still in control of the military 
structure in the mid-1960's. 5 They had grown accustomed to the 
positions (and accompanying prestige) of political decision-making. 
The hi.story of military-civilian relations in Indonesia 
prior to the coup attempt of 1965 had been checkered at best. The 
5Guy J. Pauker, "The Military in Indonesia," The Role 
of the Military in Underdeveloped Countries, ed. John J. Johnson 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1962), p. 217. 
p 
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development of the People's Security Army in 1945 had le~ the country 
with a military structure lacking any ideology upon which to base its 
actions. As Daniel Lev has pointed out, the problem for the military 
leadership prior to 1965 was to find a role for the military that would 
satisfy its political, economic, and social aspirations. 6 
The initial split between the military and civilian authorities 
came on May 7, 1949 as a result of the Roem-von Royen Agreement 
that ended guerrilla activities against the Dutch. Military men 
generally frowned on the decision while the politicians felt it to be the 
most expendient course available. This conflict in military-civilian 
relations was further exacerbated on October 17, 1952 over the ques-
ti.on of proposed civilian sponsored cut-backs in the military budget. 
Throughout the early 1950's this pattern of military-civilian tension 
manifested itself again and again until the Sumatran revolts of 1957-59 
finally clarified the relationship. 
Although it is beyond the scope of this research to become 
involved in the history of the Indonesian civil wars, several implica-
tions warrant some examination. The first result of the Sumatran-
Sulawesi rebellions was that the most radical officers such as 
Colonels Lubis, Simbolon, Husein, and Sumual were eliminated, 
6 Daniel Lev, "The Political Role of the Army in Indonesia," 
Pacific Affairs, 34 (Winter, 1963-64), 348. 
p 
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thereby removing the extremist wing of the military. Second, and far 
more important, the military gained a stronger position vis-a-vis the 
other national groups. As a result of the civil wars, the military 
began to function as an administrative elite, running former Dutch 
estates, imposing censorship, breaking up strikes, and banning 
demonstrations. The culmination of this increased political activity 
on the part of the military came when General A. H. Nasuti.on was 
elevated to cabinet level in July, 1959. In the period from the end of 
the rebellion to the institutionalization of military rule, the prestige 
and political authority of the military increased to the point that the 
military became a cornerstone of the Indonesian political scene along 
with Sukarno and the PKI. 
When attempting to examine the relationship of the military 
and civilian minds, one must naturally look at the ideological position 
that underlies each position. This is particularly true of the military 
mentality. The ideological make-up of the Indonesian military is 
similar to that of most former colonial military structures. The 
typical Indonesian officer is: 
1. More concerned with the warrior elan' than with 
technical training. 
2. Strongly religious with a deep puritanical nature 
concerning individual behavior. 
3. Deeply nationalistic with a great sense of xenophobia. 
p 
14 
4. Introspective. 
5. Violently anti-communist. (An exception must be noted 
here. While this generalization holds true for the army 
and navy, it does not apply to the Indonesian air force, 
long the bastion of radical tendencies.) 
6. Firmly convinced that, because of the mi litary's role 
in the struggles for independence, the military should 
have a predominant role in the decision-making process 
of the state . 
7. Unfamilar with, and in general opposition to, the 
7 
civilian mentality. 
It must be remembered that these seven indices interact to create a 
specific way of looking at the world. They cannot be isolated but must 
be taken in totality. The value system of the Indonesian officer corps 
must therefore be considered when viewing the military's reaction to 
the political crisis of GESTAPU. 
The Communist Party of Indonesia 
Also gaining in strength and prestige during the early 1960's 
was the Communist Party of Indonesia. The hi.story of the PKI is the 
7 Morris Janowi.tz, The Military in the Political Development 
of New Nations (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1964), 
pp. 48-71. 
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story of a series of failures brought about by inept planning and poor 
organizational strategy. Founded on May 23, 1920 under the name of 
Perserikatan Kommunist di India, the PKI takes its spiritual heritage 
from the Indies Social Democratic Association, a group founded by 
the radical Dutch socialist, H. J. F. M. Sneevliet. 8 The fledgling 
communist party later changed its name to the Partai Komunis 
Indonesia on June 7, 1924. The first chairman of the PKI was a 
Sumatran, Tan Malaka, a cautious man more concerned with devel-
oping a sound base for the party than with overthrowing the existing 
Dutch political institutions. Because of his conservative approach to 
politics, Tan Malaka was outvoted by his more militant colleagues in 
1926 on the question of a proposed assault on the telephone/telegraph 
buildings in the capital city of Batavia (later renamed Djakarta after 
the termination of Dutch authority). The attempt failed, setting in 
8 Hendri.k Josephus Franciscus Marie Sneevliet, born 
May 13, 1883, founded the Indies Social Democratic Association in 
1914 to stir up nationalistic feelings in Indonesia. Previously a union 
organizer in the Netherlands, Sneevliet mi.grated to the Indies in 1912. 
After a split in the Social Democratic Association in 1917, Sneevli.et 
emerged as the leader of the more revolutionary wing of the movement. 
Because of his renewed interest in uni.on organizing, Sneevliet was 
deported from Indonesia in 1917. Upon his return to Europe, Sneevliet 
was associated for a ti.me with the Communist International. In 1929 
he helped found the Revolutionary Socialist Party in the Netherlands. 
He served as a parliamentary representative of that body from 1933 
to 1937. Sneevliet was executed by the Germans on April 13, 1942. 
p 
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motion a program of repression so severe that Ruth McVey has said, 
"this action put an effective end to communist activity in the Indies for 
the remaining period of Dutch rule. 119 The crack-down following the 
ill-fated assault netted 13,000 arrests and prompted the party to go 
underground, not to re-emerge until 1935. During the interim, 
Tan Malaka, disenchanted with the party's lack of progress, split 
from the PKI to form the Marxist-Leninist Party that operated out 
of Bangkok. 
The void in leadership during the period of enforced 
seclusion was filled by Musso, a hard-liner favored by the Stalinist 
regime in Moscow. Under his leadership, a second attempt to over-
throw the government took place at Madiun, Central Java in September, 
1948. Communist guerrilla units seized the city on September 18 and 
held the area until the 30th when government forces retook the city, 
executing Musso in the process. These 1948 rebellions were espe-
cially costly as 36,000 followers were arrested and executed, 
including 11 top PKI leaders, five members of the Politburo among 
them. Once again the party was forced underground to regroup. 
The significance of the ill-fated Madiun campaign goes 
farther than a simple tactical error, however. Granted, there was 
9Robert Scalapino, The Communist Revolution in Asia 
(Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1969), p. 276. 
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a large loss of life at a ti.me when the PK! was desperately trying to 
assert itself i.n Indonesian poli.ti.cal li.fe. Even more important, 
however, than thi.s loss of vi.tal personnel was the image of the PKI 
that was created as a result of the abortive coup attempt. In the eyes 
of many Indonesians, the actions of the PKI, coming at a ti.me when 
the Republic was fighting for i.ts poli.ti.cal life, were very treasonous. 
Thi.s argument was gi.ven further credence when the PKI issued a bitter 
denunci.ati.on of Sukarno aher the defeat at Madi.un. Such an action 
simply served to alienate even more persons who admired Sukarno as 
the Father of the Indonesian Revolution. Thus, in the eyes of many 
Indonesians, the PKI became the symbol of disunity in Indonesian 
politics. This was an image that would remain for many years and 
may even have been an underlying rationale for the bloody defeat of the 
PKI in the mid-1960's. In a country where concensus is paramount, 
the PK! had earned the reputation as the exception to the normal 
established order of things poli.ti.cal. 
In 1950, the leadership of the party was assumed by 
Dipa Nusantara Ai.di.t. Widely acclaimed as a skillful organizer who 
was more oriented toward Peking than Moscow i.n his ideological 
persuasions, the youthful Ai.di.t (31 i.n 1950) presided over the resur-
gence of the PKI in the 1950's. In 1955, the party won 16.4 percent 
(6, 176,000 votes) of the votes for the Indonesian F arl i.ament. This 
p 
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total placed them fourth with 39 out of the 257 contested seats. This 
must be considered a remarkable showing in light of the demise of the 
party following the debacle of 1948 just seven years prior. The party 
was eagerly looking forward to the 1959 elections in hopes of gaining 
even more support. But these elections were never held due to the 
insistance of the military and the capriciousness of President Sukarno. 
By the mid-1960's, Aidit had built the PKI's membership to 
three million. In addition, about 14 million members were loosely 
associ.ated through the PKI sponsored front organizations, such as, 
the women's group, Gerwani, and youth grdup, Permuda Rakjat. To 
do this, Aidit had to compromise his ideological purity. He called for 
non-interference with other parties' activities, pledged to cooperate 
in various national fronts, and proclaimed a belief in the Panta Si.la, 
Sukarno's amalgamation of religion, nationalism, humanism, 
democracy, and social justice. He stated that membership in the 
PKI was open to all. "The only thing we require," said Aidit, "is 
that they must be patriots . " 1 O 
By the mid-1960's, the PKI had worked hard to gain 
legitimacy as Sukarno's most faithful disci.ples. They were so 
successful that by mid-1965 it appeared as if Aidit would be named 
10John Hughes, Indonesian Upheaval (New York: 
David McKay Company, 1 967), p. 84. 
19 
Sukarno's political heir. Speaking at the 45th anniversary celebration 
of the PKI on May 23, 1965, Sukarno said, "Aidit is the bulwark of 
Indonesia. 1111 It had been a difficult road from Batavia in 1926 through 
Madiun in 1948 to that day. Since 1950 the PKI had come to represent 
as well a disciplined organization as there was in Indonesia. Thus, on 
the eve of GESTAPU, the PKI was a threat to the only other highly 
centralized organization in Indonesian society, the military. The 
resulting conflict in political leadership was to re-affirm the superi-
ority of the military yet one more time. 
Sukarno 
Sitting atop the Indonesian political environment and 
thoroughly dominating it through his own unique brand of personal 
politics was President Sukarno, Great Father of the Revolution. The 
preface to Sukarno's autobiography aptly sums up the measure of the 
man: "The simplest way to describe Sukarno is to say he is a great 
lover. He loves his country, he loves his people, he loves women, 
he loves art, and, best of all, he loves himself. 1112 Sukarno has 
been called many things -- meglo-maniac, charmer, faddist. As 
11 Scalapino, The Communist Revolution in Asia, p. 279. 
12Donald Kirk, "Here Lies Bung Karno," New Leader, 
April 10, 1967, p. 6. 
p 
Donald Kirk has remarked, "Sukarno was the best speaker I ever 
heard. He could have been a movie star. He had that kind of 
talent." 13 Yet there is one thing that all experts agree on; that in 
his every action, Sukarno was the manifestation of the classical 
Indonesian mentality. A brief sketch of the man will reveal his 
classical Javanese personality. To do so, the reader must seek the 
roots of the Indonesian nationalist ideal which Sukarno came to 
exemplify. 
20 
The Indonesian nationalism that surfaced a~er World War II 
had its philosophical beginnings in the first quarter of the 20th century. 
More specifically, Indonesian nationalism can be dated from 1908 when 
a small group of Javanese medical students formed a society named 
Boedi Oetomo (High Endeavor) to promote cultural ideas and educa-
tional reforms in response to the Ethical Policy of the Dutch instituted 
around the turn of the century. At the same time, another group, the 
Sarekat Dagang Islam, was established to protect Muslim cultural and 
bus-lness expression against the growing overseas Chinese population 
in Indonesia. Some members of the Sarekat Islam also belonged to 
the Social Democratic Association, the fore-runner of the PKI. Thus, 
when the PKI was crushed a~er its futile coup attempt of November, 
1926, the Sarekat Islam movement was also doomed to extinction. To 
13Ibid., p. 9. 
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fill the intellectual voi.d left by the destruction of the PKI and the 
Sarekat Islam, a number of student study groups were formed. 
One of these groups, based in Bandung, was headed by a young 
East Javanese civil engineer, Sukarno. 14 
Sukarno was born in 1901, the son of a Javanese school 
teacher and a Balinese dancer. As a boy of fourteen, he was sent 
to live as a foster son in the home of 0. S. Tjokroaminoto, a former 
prominent leader of the Sarekat Islam movement. During hi.s stay 
i.n Tjokroami.noto's home, Sukarno acquired many of his radical 
views on nati.onali.sm. There can be no doubt that this period had a 
profound effect on the young impressionable Sukarno. 
In 1927, when he was twenty-six years old, Sukarno helped 
found the Nationalist Party of Indonesia (PNI). The PNI was to become 
Sukarno's mouthpiece i.n his rise to prominence during the struggles 
for independence in the late 1940's. While there were several other 
nationalist groups operating i.n Indonesia at the ti.me (notably the 
Nahdatul Ulama, a Muslim group), i.t was the PNI that ultimately was 
to become the leading spokesman for the Indonesian cause. This was 
14sukarno's father, a teacher, long desired his son to 
be a "servant of the fatherland." Because of his fluency i.n Dutch, 
Sukarno was admitted to the European Elementary School in 
Modjokerto. In 1916 he advanced to the "high school" in Surabaya. 
Sukarno's education continued upon his admission into the Institute 
of Technology in Bandung i.n 1920. He graduated i.n 1926 with an 
advanced degree i.n engineering. 
probably due to Sukarno's great personal magnetism, which even at 
this early stage in his career, was his major asset. 
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In 1 929, Sukarno was arrested by the Dutch because of his 
nationalist activities. He served two years of a possible three-year 
sentence. This pattern of arrest and imprisonment by the Dutch was 
to continue throughout the 1930's. In 1933, Sukarno was arrested 
again and exiled to Sumatra. It was during this confinement that 
Sukarno established personal relationships with many men who were 
destined to become his associates in government. Among his cell-
mates was Mohammed Hatta, who was to serve as Vice-President 
from 1949 to 1956 when he resigned over a petty dispute with Sukarno. 
If the anti-Dutch agitations of the 1920's and 1930's had 
planted the seeds of discontent, it was the Japanese occupation that 
allowed the Indonesian nationalist movement to blossom. At the time 
of the initial take-over, Japanese officials rounded up and incarcerated 
all potential Indonesian political dissidents. Sukarno was among those 
arrested and detained. By using flattery, gi le, and calculated ri.sks, 
Sukarno was able to gain acceptance to the inner circle of Japanese 
authority to the extent that when the Japanese declared Indonesia a 
free republic on August 17, 1945, he was in a position to be named 
president of the new state. This was an office he was destined to hold 
unti.l post GEST APU events forced him from office on March 12, 1967. 
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While Sukarno's formal educational experiences had taught 
him the sharp dichotemy between eastern and western value systems, 
he was no ordinary intellectual rebel. 15 From his earliest days, 
Sukarno was constantly driven by his desire for Indonesians to reach 
social parity with the white (western) world. Indeed, much of 
Sukarno's personal appeal wi.th the Indonesian masses can be gleaned 
from his anti-colonial attitudes. Sukarno regarded himself not only 
as the founder of the Indonesian state, but as the very personification 
of anti-westernism as well. Not long after the announcement of 
"Guided Democracy," Sukarno declared, 
I belong to that group of people who are bound in spiritual 
longing by the romanticism of the revolution. I am inspired 
by it. I am fascinated by it. I am completely absorbed by it. 
I am crazed, I am obsessed by the romanti.ci.sm of revolution. 
That is why I, who have given the topmost leadership in the 
struggles of the Indonesian nation, never ti.re of appealing 
and exhorting: Solve our national problems in a revolutionary 
way, make the revolutionary spirit surge on, see to it that the 
fire of our revolution does not die or grow dim, not even for a 
single moment. Come, then, keep fanning the flames of the 
leaping fire of revolution. Brothers and sisters, let us become 
logs to feed the flames of revolution! 16 
In the days before GESTAPU, such fiery rhetoric was not lost on the 
Indonesian people. 
15Kirk, "Here Lies Bung Karno," p. 8. 
16Robert Shaplen, Time Out of Hand (New York: 
Harper & Row, 1970), p. 65. 
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In many ways, Sukarno's style paralleled that of the 1960's 
civil rights leaders who taught their followers to reject white society 
and glorify their own history. Indeed, some writers feel that 
Sukarno's greatest contribution to Indonesia was his resentment of 
the Dutch in particular and the Western ideal in general. Touching on 
this subject in his autobiography, Sukarno commented, "The Dutch 
children never played with native children. They were the good, the 
pure, the snow-white Westerners and they looked down on me because 
I was a native or 'inlander. 11117 It was such a frame of mind that 
Sukarno brought to the political leadership of Indonesia in the years 
before 1965. 
It is only at this point that the tragic flaw in the man's 
personality appears. It is indeed ironic that even while Sukarno 
openly worked against the ways of the West, he really yearned to be 
like Westerners. He drove western cars. He dressed in the latest 
western fashions. He entertained in western style. When questioned 
about his life-style, Sukarno rationalized, "I reacted to the poverty 
and tragedy in which I was brought up in. I like my pleasures, I have 
earned them." 18 It was this inner contradiction that was to destroy 
Sukarno in the wake of GESTAPU. 
17Kirk, "Here Lies Bung Karna," p. 7. 
18Jb"d 0 l o J P• CJ• 
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During the late 1950's and early 1960's, a sense of creeping 
authoritarianism could be noticed in Sukarno's actions. By this time, 
Sukarno felt that what was needed was not a chaotic parliamentary 
system which had no basis in either Indonesian thought or tradition, 
but a strong bapak (father fi.gure) to draw the country together. By 
1 957, Sukarno was ready to put his plans into action. In February of 
that year, Sukarno announced his desire to return to the old 1945 
executive oriented constitution. At the same ti.me, he introduced his 
"Guided Democracy" which would assure the chief executive (Sukarno 
as President) strong central power and offer an alternative to the 
western democratic, i.e. , imperialist tradition. In 1959, Sukarno 
further consolidated hi.s position by di.ssolvi.ng the elected parliament 
and instituting a gotong royong (mutual cooperation) assembly of his 
own choosing. This trend toward concentration of power reached its 
zenith in 1963 when Sukarno was named President For Life. By this 
date it was apparent that democracy, in the western sense of the word, 
had become a dead issue in Indonesia. 
If Sukarno can be said to have given Indonesia a sense of 
unity i.n the years before 1965, i.t can also be said that he was the 
indirect cause of the crisis in political leadership that occurred i.n that 
year. Because of hi.s penchant for high li.vi.ng, by the mi.d-1960's 
Sukarno was in serious ill-health. It was widely felt that his demise 
would touch off a violent struggle for power among the only two forces 
p 
in society capable of assuming control, the military and the PKI. 
There was no legal line of succession because the Vice-Presidency, 
vacant since Hatta's resignation in 1956, had never been filled. 
Furthermore, Sukarno had given little indication of his preference 
of an heir apparent. Thus, the classic struggle for political power 
between the military and civilian mentalities was joined. Both 
contending parties knew the consequences should the other gain the 
upper hand. 
The question of a legal successor to Sukarno became a 
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moot point, however, because on the night of September 30 -October 1, 
1965, Lt. Col. Untung, battalion commander of Sukarno's bodyguards, 
attempted a coup d'etat that was destined to change forever the course 
of Indonesian politics. 
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CHART SUMfv1ARIZING THE DECLINE OF CONSTITUTIONAL 
DEMOCRACY IN THE INDONESIA REPUBLIC 
August 1 945 The Japanese surrender. Dr. Sukarno proclaims the 
independent Republic of Indonesia before the return of the Dutch 
colonial power. 
September 1948 An uprising of the Indonesian Communist Party 
(PKI) is quelled. 
December 1949 After two "police actions" against the nationalists, 
the Dutch finally concede sovereignty to Indonesia, but leave 
open the question of the future ownership of Dutch West New 
Guinea. 
1950 Indonesia adopts a Western-style parliamentary constitution. 
1951-1953 An uprising of the fanatical "Darul Is lam" movement 
gains momentum in protest against President Sukarno's failure 
to make Indonesia an Islamic state. 
September 1955 General elections. Nationalist, Muslim, and 
Communist parties dominate the parliament. 
February 1957 Sukarno proposes to introduce "Guided Democracy" 
to give the executive strong central power and as an alternative 
to Western democratic practice. 
December 1957 In his campaign to wrest Dutch West New Guinea 
("West Irian") from The Hague, Sukarno breaks off diplomatic 
relations with Holland, expels all Dutch subjects, and begins 
appropriating all Dutch interests. 
February 1958 Regional military commanders rebel in Sumatra, 
where a "Revolutionary Government of the Republic of 
Indonesia" is declared. 
1959-1960 Sukarno announces his "Political Manifesto," which 
is the basic document of "Guided Democracy," and becomes 
head of government as well as head of state. 
Sukarno dissolves the elected parliament and replaces it 
with a gotong royong (mutual cooperation) assembly of his own 
choosing and subordinated to his authority. The new policy of 
NASAKOM (cooperation between Nationalists, religious parties, 
and Communists) is confirmed • 
February 1960 Khrushchev visits Indonesia. 
1961 The Sumatra rebellion peters out. Indonesian troops begin 
infiltrating "West Irian" to harass the Dutch. 
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1962 The New York agreement gives Indonesia provisional control 
of West Irian under the aegis of the United Nations but stipulates 
that the population must be granted their own "Act of Free 
Choice" in 1969. 
The Darul Islam revolt is finally suppressed. 
September 1963 Sukarno launches serious military "Confrontation" 
against the new expanded Federation of Malaysia. 
January 1965 Sukarno takes Indonesia out of the UN in protest 
against the admission of Malaysia. 
September-October 1965 An abortive Communist coup in Indonesia 
i.s followed by a widespread massacre of Communists by the 
military and the Muslims. 
1966 Muslim youth movements organize massive demonstrations 
against Sukarno, the Communists, and the Chinese. General 
Suharto assumes effective power. 
June-September 1966 Confrontation is ended by signed agreement. 
Indonesia rejoins the UN. 
February-March 1967 Suharto officially becomes acting president. 
CHAPTER III 
THE COUP THAT FAILED 
The Rumours 
In the days before GESTAPU, Indonesia was besieged 
by rumours of plots and counterplots having varying i.deologi.cal 
persuasions. One rumour, widely circulated by communist party 
press organs, told of a purported "Council of Generals" that would 
stage a right-wing coup on Armed Forces Day (October 5). The 
avowed purpose for the take-over, according to the communists, 
was to destroy the PKI and solidify the posi.ti.on of the military i.n the 
Indonesian political picture. At the same time, it was alleged that 
Aidit had pressed Sukarno to create a "fifth force" of armed peasants 
and workers to act as a countervai. lent to the growing power of the 
mi. l i.tary. 1 9 In a speech on January 17, 1965, Ai.di.t revealed, 
"I have submitted a proposal to President Sukarno to arm immediately 
the workers and peasants, the pillars of the revolution. No less than 
19when Sukarno challenged Army Chief of Staff Yani. on 
the existence of a "Council of Generals," he was told that i.t was 
merely a group of senior officers who met from ti.me to ti.me to 
discuss "political matters" and some internal Army affairs mainly 
having to do with promotion and retirement of senior officers. 
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five million organized workers and ten million organized peasants are 
ready to take up arms. 1120 Such a statement was clearly a challenge 
to the military' s position of dominance in society. General Sutopo 
Juwono, director of the Army's intelligence division, stated the 
military's position when he said, 
Our feeling at the ti.me was that if the fifth force was set up, 
the Army -- the armed forces -- would be separated from the 
people and we would end up with a dual command. We consid-
ered the proposal an outside effort, especially by Peking and the 
PKI, to divide the Army from the people. 21 
Even at this early point the lines of confrontation were becoming 
apparent. In addition, Sukarno's continued physical demise and the 
arrival of a team of communist Chinese doctors lent plausibility to the 
suspicion of an externally inspired communist plot. It was rumoured 
that these Chinese acupuncture specialists reported Sukarno's condi.-
ti.on directly to Ai.di.t. 22 Indeed, on the eve of the coup attempt 
Sukarno's health had become a political football. Sukarno scoffed at 
any suggestion of an attempt to di.sp lace him. 23 
20The proposed "fifth force" would be an alternative to the 
four regular branches of the Indonesian military -- army, navy, air 
force, and marines. 
21 Scalapi.no, The Communist Revolution in Asia, p. 291 • 
22shaplen, Time Out of Hand, pp. 94-95. 
23when told of the rumours, Sukarno dismissed them as 
"PKI phobia" or "psychological warfare" aimed at sidetracking the 
"revolutionary spirit." 
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The Strategy of the Plotters 
Despite the President's denials, the coup attempt of 
September 30 - October 1, 1965 followed a highly i.ntri.cate plan. The 
plotters, le~-wtng members of the military supported by communist 
front organizations, notably the women's and youth organi.zati.ons, 
chose Halim ai.rfteld outside Djakarta as their base of operations. The 
commandant of the base, Major Sujono, as well as the Ai.r Force Chief 
of Staff Dhani were among the plotters. 
H- Hour for the coup attempt was to be 4:00 a. m., 
October 1, 1965. It was hoped that the coup forces would be able to 
achieve their objectives before morning thus negating any reaction 
from opposing forces. Thi.s coup force was di.vi.ded i.nto three groups, 
each with a specific objective to be achieved. The names of the attack 
forces were derived from mystical characters in the classical 
Javanese shadow play, the wayang kuli.t. The Pasupati., composed of 
Untung's Tjakrabi.rwa palace guards and Permuda Rakjat (youth group) 
trainees, was given the task of seizing the top command of the military. 
24 
A list of eight generals was supplied. The murder squads were to 
24The eight officers included: General Nasuti.on, Minister 
of Defense, General Yant, Army Chief of Staff, Major General 
Parman, Intelligence Di.vision, and staff officers, Major General 
Suprapto, Major General Harjono, Bri.gi.di.er General Pandijaitan, 
Bri.gi.di.er General Siswomi.hardjo, and Brigidier General Sukendro. 
The plotters failed to realize that Sukendro was out of the country 
at the ti.me of the coup. 
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either capture or kill these selected members of the military high 
command. Those on the list were either killed at their residences, 
on the way to Halim, or at the base itself. Their bodies were buried 
in a remote section of the airfield. 25 The Bimasakti, composed of 
visiting Central and East Javanese battalions in Djakarta for the 
Armed Forces Day celebration, had the objective of capturing and 
holding the Presi.denti.al Palace, radio station, and telecommunications 
center on Merdeka Square. A reserve force, the Gatot Katja (ai.r 
force and youth groups) remained on ready alert at the airfield. At 
the appointed hour, unmarked troop convoys rolled into the streets of 
Djakarta. 
Reaction and Defeat 
When news of the coup attempt reached President Sukarno 
on the morning of October 1, four options were considered as vi.able 
alternatives to insure his safety against the plotters. 26 First, he 
25Photographs of the bodies of the murdered generals 
discovered after the defeat of the coup, helped inflame military 
sentiment against the PKI. 
26Qn the night of the coup, Sukarno drove first to Senayan, 
a suburb of Djakarta to address one of the "functional groups" that sat 
in the Parliament. After the speech he returned to the Presidential 
Palace only long enough to change clothes before driving to the Hotel 
Indonesia to pick up his Japanese wife, Dewi., who had been attending 
a wedding reception. They then drove together to res1 in 
Slipi where Sukarno spent the night. ;\1'1\5 Tow~ 
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could go to a "well situated house" i.n the Djakarta suburb of 
Kebajoram. This was the residence of one of his wives. 27 Second, 
he could put out to sea on a vessel of the still loyal Indonesian navy. 
This alternative would totally remove him from physical danger and 
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also make any escape more feasible. Opting to remain i.n the country, 
Sukarno could choose to travel to the Presidential Palace at Boger 
approximately forty miles from Djakarta vi.a an armoured car. The 
last option was for Sukarno to go to the rebel stronghold at Halim 
and openly "confront" the plotters. In a fateful decision that would 
ultimately cause hi.s political downfall, President Sukarno chose this 
last alternative. 0. G. Roeder sees thi.s deci.si.on as the tragic flaw 
in Sukarno's actions at this ti.me. "If Sukarno had gone to the palace 
he would have been in a position to si.de either with Untung or Suharto 
or to play one against the other. 1128 However, for reasons known only 
by Sukarno, he opted for the tri.p to Halim. 
The plotters, now calling themselves the Revolutionary 
Council of Indonesia issued their first radio communique at 7: 15 a. m. 
27 Over the course of hi.s lifetime, Sukarno was rumoured 
to have been married 18 times. At the time of the coup he had five 
wives (one more than the legal Muslim limit). Si.nee each of his 
wives had her own establishment, he always had a wide choice of 
accommodations • 
28Arnold C. Brackman, The Communist Collapse i.n 
Indonesia (New York: W. W. Norton and Compan p. 86. 
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on the morning of the fi.rst. 29 In this initial message, the plotters 
stated that the purpose of the coup had been to smash the reactionary 
"Council of Generals" who themselves had planned a coup for 
October 5, Armed Forces Day. After pledging to work for the good 
of the Indonesian people, the communique concluded with a list of 
some fifty prominent military and civilian leaders who allegedly 
supported the actions of the September 30th Movement, the group 
claiming responsibili.ty for the coup. 30 
It was only at this point that President Sukarno broke his 
silence on the unfolding drama. When viewing his actions in retro-
spect, hi.s behavior was curious indeed. On the evening of the first, 
Sukarno issued a Presidenti.al Order of the Day. 31 Along with the 
expected call for calm and increased vigilance on the part of the 
citizenry, Sukarno chose this moment to appoint Major General 
Pranoto Reksosamudro as acting commander-in-chief of the Army. 
The urgent questi.on is this -- unless Sukarno knew that Yani had been 
on the list of officers to be executed by the Pasupati, why did he need 
29-rhe communique is included in its entirety in the 
appendix to this paper. 
30It is interesting to note that many of the people included 
on the list later said they were never consulted or gave permission to 
use their names in the statement. 
31The text of the Presidential Order is included in the 
appendix to this paper. 
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to appoint a new commandant at this crucial juncture? The timing of 
this announcement would be crucial later as the military attempted to 
prove Sukarno's prior knowledge and involvement in the abortive coup. 
As will be recalled, one group of the coup force (the 
Bimasakti) was to gain control of essential communications centers 
located in the heart of Djakarta along Merdeka Square. During the day 
following the take-over (October 1) loyal government forces of the 
Kostrad (Strategic Reserve) under General Suharto negotiated with the 
plotters holding the square. By using threats and appeals to nation-
alism as a basis, by the end of the day Suharto was able to persuade 
these troops to capitulate and release their hold on the vital communi-
cations facilities. Having now driven a wedge in the organization of 
the coup forces, Suharto now began to evolve a counter-coup strategy 
that aimed at defeating the conspirators. 
With the coup in a state of precarious balance, the PKI 
created a massive blunder that ultimately provided the documentary 
justification for the party's own obliteration at the hands of the military. 
The PKI sponsored daily newspaper, the Harian Rakjat endorsed the 
coup attempt in an editorial in its October 2, 1965 edition. Accom-
.panied by a cartoon of two generals with dollar signs for epaulettes, 
shoulder badges of the "Council of Generals" and caps with the letters, 
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"C. I .A." propped up by an evil-looking Uncle Sam, the Harian Rakjat 
editorial read as follows: 
It has happened that on the 30th of September measures 
were taken to safeguard President Sukarno and the Republic 
of Indonesia from a coup by a so-called Council of Generals. 
According to what has been announced by the September 30th 
Movement, which is headed by Lieutenant Colonel Untung of 
a Tjakrabirwa battalion, action taken to preserve President 
Sukarno and the Republic of Indonesia from the Council of 
Generals is patriotic and revolutionary. 
Whatever the justi. fication that may have been used by the 
Council of Generals in its attempt, the staging of a coup is a 
condemnable and counter-revolutionary act. 
We the people fully comprehend what Lieutenant Colonel 
Untung has asserted in carrying out his patriotic movement. 
But whatever the case may be, this is an internal army 
affair. On the other hand, we the people, who are conscious 
of the policies and duties of the revolution, are convinced of 
the correctness of the action taken by the September 30th 
Movement to preserve the revolution and the people. 
The sympathy and support of the people is surely on the 
side of the September 30th Movement. We call on the people 
to intensify their vigilance and be prepared to confront all 
eventualities. 32 
Thus, in an incredibly ill-advised move, the PKI sealed its own fate 
by tying itself forever to the actions of the September 30th Movement. 
Meanwhile, after regaining control at Merdeka Square, 
Suharto planned his counter-attack against the plotters headquartered 
at Halim field. In the early hours of October 2, Suharto's Kostrad 
troops moved against the now disorganized plotters at the airfield. 
The coup attempt was defeated by 6: 1 0 a. m. on the morning of the 
32Hughes, Indonesian Upheaval, p. 78. 
second as Suharto's forces retook the area with no casualties. 
Commenting later on the action, Suharto said, 
I gave top priority to avoiding bloodshed. I could have 
seized the radio station early in the morning. But this would 
have resulted i.n shooting and at that time I still did not know 
the real background of the September 30th Movement. Once 
the announcement of the Revolutionary Council and i.ts com-
position had been made, their real activities were unmasked, 
convincing us that we no longer need hesitate to take action 
against the September 30th Movement. 33 
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The remnants of the September 30th Movement, now more aptly called 
a retreat, were pursued into the rural areas beyond Djakarta. Within 
a few days loyal government troops had either regained control or 
neutralized the rebel elements. The real blood-letting was yet to come. 
The defeat of the coup attempt exposed the flaws in the 
plotters' strategy. The failure of the Bimasakti to hold the communi-
cations center allowed word of the coup attempt to be conveyed to loyal 
government troops throughout Indonesia. The failure to kill General 
Nasution provided a symbolic rallying point for the counter-coup forces. 
The plotters made a fundamental error when they failed to regard 
Suharto as a potential threat. By ignoring him, the plotters allowed 
him to operate with a relatively free hand until he, not they became 
the master of the situation. Most importantly, the plotters failed to 
gauge accurately the public mood of the citizenry of Indonesia. The 
331 bid . ' p . 72 . 
plotters felt that the coup would be the signal for a spontaneous 
reaction among the masses. This did not happen. As the Sultan of 
Jogjakarta, now a prominent figure in the government of Suharto, 
explained, "There was no popular uprising of the people." The 
communists, he said, misjudged the temper of the people. 34 The 
PKI had become a mass party that lacked any support of the masses. 
Indeed, the defeat of the coup was to signal something quite the 
opposite than what the plotters had intended. 
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34Brackman, The Communist Collapse in Indonesia, p. 140. 
CHAPTER IV 
THE BLOODY AFTERJ\;1,A.TH OF GESTAPU 
The defeat of the coup attempt signaled the beginning of a 
massive reign of terror in Indonesia. The military, now wearing the 
hero's laurels due to Suharto's defeat of the purported communist 
coup, was enraged over Sukarno's failure to denounce the PKI and its 
role in the aborted take-over. 35 Photographs of the slain generals' 
mutilated bodies buried at Halim further served to accentuate the 
growing rift between the military and civilian mentalities. Further 
fuel was added to the budding controversy when Sukarno failed to 
appear at a memorial service honoring the murdered officers. The 
sight of General Nasution on crutches at the ceremonies, evoked a 
strong emotional response that was not lost on the military men 
attending the rites. 36 In retrospect, Sukarno's failure to attend the 
function must be viewed as a fundamental error on his part if he 
351n the days immediately following the coup attempt, 
Sukarno never made any reference to the role of the PKI in the 
take-over attempt. 
36General Nasution injured his foot while fleeing the 
squads on the night of the coup attempt. 
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wished to remain in control of the political system. It was at this time 
that the military announced creation of a "Combined Action Body for 
Crushing the September 30th Movement." This organization was a 
concerted attempt to unite all anti-communist sentiment explicitly 
against the PKI. The fact that many overseas Chinese residing in 
Indonesia were also victims of the purge implied the military's belief 
of complicity on the part of the Chinese communists. Indeed, one of 
the first actions of the mob (notably anti-communist Muslim student 
groups) was to attack the embassy of the People's Republic of China. 
The motives for the blood-letting were varied. To the 
military, the need was to eliminate the PKI as a contending political 
force. To this end, military units stood idly by as mobs attacked and 
destroyed the PKI headquarters in Djakarta. The homes of Aidit and 
other leading PKI figures were looted and burned. Slogans such as 
"Crush Aidit" or "Crush the PKI" began to appear with regularity on 
the walls and billboards of the city. More importantly, there were 
few, if any, arrests of vandals during this period. When criticized 
for their inaction during the disturbances, the military rationalized, 
"It was the communists or us. If we hadn't killed them, they would 
have killed us. 1137 
37Hughes, Indonesian Upheaval, p. 189. 
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To the Muslim religious groups, the killings took on a 
mystical religious connotation. This was particularly true in the outer 
islands. East Java provides a classic example. In this area, most of 
the executions were by beheading. The bodies were buried in one 
grave, the head in another. This action satisfied the local belief that 
decapitation and separate burial prevented the spirits of the dead 
victim from returning to haunt the slayers. 38 In other areas as well, 
the patterns of killing reflected deep divisions of race, religion, and 
culture. 
To the student groups, notably the radical university student 
group, the KAMI, the purges were an expression of a nationalistic 
fervor to drive out the overseas Chinese. For many years, the resi-
dent Chinese aliens had assumed a predominant position in the 
Indonesian economic structure. Although numbering only three million 
in 1965, the overseas Chinese controlled over 70 percent of the 
"native" industries. The student groups felt that the purges offered 
an opportunity to redress this situation. Indeed, the militant student 
groups were later to become the most vocal critics of the military 
when the military sought to wind down the purge. 
38s. S. King, "Great Purge of Indonesia," New York Ti.mes 
Magazine, May 8, 1966, p. 28. 
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To the average man in the street, however, the motive was 
much simpler; the killings were rationalized on the basis of self-
defense. It was a simple matter of kill or be killed. As one of 
Indonesia's best known artists, Antonio Blanco has remarked, "Every 
night we could see one village after another go up in flames. We were 
tn deathly fear of our own lives. 1139 Another Balinese resident, a 
Dutc.h woman, said, "Everyone got the blood lust. At night, sleeping 
with guns under our pillows, we found ourselves saying, 'Why don't 
they kill that man instead of this one? 11140 
Internationally, world reaction to the events in Indonesia 
varied. The United Nations made no official statement. Neither did 
many of the non-aligned countries. The communist world (Moscow 
and Peking) viewed the passing of the largest communist party in 
Southeast Asta with a cautious sorrow. P ravada conceded the 
"possibility" that a PKI "adventurist" clique "may" have been involved. 
The Chinese were more outspoken. Calling the crimes "heinous and 
deliberate ... unprecedented in history," the Chinese condemned the 
Indonesian military for its handling of the situation. 41 (In retrospect, 
this may be viewed more of an attack along ethnic lines than ideological 
39
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ones. Recall that the overseas Chinese were prime targets of the 
purge.) The West treated the situation lighter than it would the 
genocide in Biafra in 1968. While several publications42 ran feature 
articles on the events in Indonesia, the United States government 
never officially commented on the situation. 
Statistics on the number of persons killed during the purge 
varied according to the source consulted. The Economist set the 
figure around one million. The Washington Post reduced this figure 
to 500,000. Life magazine calculated 400,000 casualties while the 
New York Times estimated from 150,000 to 400,000 victims. In a 
speech before his death in 1970, Sukarno set the figure at 87, 000. 
The real figure will never be known. 
At this point, an assessment of the impact of GEST APU 
and its bloody aftermath must be made. The economy of Indonesia, 
already weak before 1965, was pushed past the breaking point. The 
cost to Indonesia, both directly in terms of actual expenditures and 
indirectly in terms of lost foreign aid (once in a fit of pique over the 
United States' refusal to send Indonesia any further foreign aid because 
of his anti-Malaysia policy, Sukarno told the United States to "go to 
hell with your aid") was tremendous. The political process was a 
42Major publications with articles on Indonesia included 
the Times of London, Guardian, and Saturday Review. 
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shambles. Any sense of constitutional legitimacy had been destroyed 
by Sukarno's constant usurpation of power during the late 1950's. 
Political organizations of varying persuasions had been systematically 
outlawed and their leaders jailed to the extent that the concept of 
democratic choice was a mere illusion in Indonesia. Political authority 
was now based on the monopoly of the instruments of violence. 
Socially, Indonesia was a nation caught up i.n a massive witch 
hunt aimed at eradicating a philosophy alien to the Indonesian mentality. 
It was a situation that pitted neighbor against neighbor in a struggle 
that threatened to destroy the very concept of the Indonesian nation. 
Even more important, however, was the fact the GESTAPU had created 
a cerebral gap in the Indonesian mind. Any sense of ideological conti-
nuity had been shattered. Nationalism seemed to have no meaning any 
longer. Marxism had apparently been violently repudiated. Even the 
personalism of President Sukarno, long a source of security for the 
average Indonesian, was now in serious doubt. Students of the 
Indonesian experience have never found any document le~ by the PKI 
describing the nature of the character a Marxist Indonesia would have 
taken had the coup been successful. One can only speculate on its 
essence. In light of this situation, the mantle of political legitimacy 
was there for the taking by the first group that could claim to speak for 
the masses of Indonesia. It would not remain unclaimed for long. 
CHAPTER V 
THE TRIALS AND SUKARNO - I 
It was in this atmosphere of emotional reaction to GESTAPU 
that the military announced the trials of suspected conspirators in the 
coup attempt. The defendants selected for prosecution were either 
members of the now discredited PKI or left-wing officers in the 
military. The defendants were to stand trial before a mahmi llub 
(military tribunal) composed solely of highly ranking military 
. 43 
off1cers. The attorneys for the state were also members of the 
army's legal division. Foreign newsmen were barred from the pro-
ceedings, making Antara, the official government news agency, the 
only source of information about the trials. Thus, the military was 
to be in complete control of this attempt to resolve the crisis in 
political leadership that was threatening to tear Indonesia apart. 
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The verdicts were foregone conclusions. The significance 
of the trials, therefore, was not the verdicts rendered but the way in 
43
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44The loudest critics were the student groups who viewed 
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which the mi.li.tary used the proceedings to discredit President Sukarno 
by linking him to the plotters in a superior-subordinate relationship. 
The military was forced to employ such tactics in the days immediately 
following the coup attempt because Sukarno was still enormously 
popular with the majority of Indonesian citizens. As one young pro-
fessor at the University of Indonesia said, "We need Sukarno. They 
(the people) idolize him. What are they going to do if they hear we've 
thrown him out? They might even start fighting for him. 1145 State-
ments such as these were indicative of the mood of the people. A direct 
confrontation at this delicate juncture might have ended in defeat for the 
military. Operating in typical Javanese fashion, the military evolved 
its plan of indirect attack against the government of Bung Karno. 
The Early Trials 
In the early trials, the military moved cautiously, selecting 
minor personalities. It was hoped that these early trials would set the 
stage for Sukarno's repudiation without having to confront him directly. 
Njono, a PKI labor front leader and the coordinator of the youth groups 
at Halim during the coup attempt was tried and sentenced to death 
in February, 1966. He was to be the first individual to be legally 
punished for the events of September 30 - October 1, 1965. During his 
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trial, Njono repeatedly said the PKI had staged the revolt in order to 
keep a "group of army generals" from seizing power. 46 Just as the 
Harian Rakjat editorial had implicated the PKI, the testimony given 
at the Njono trial tended to re-enforce the military's contention that 
the PKI was behind the take-over attempt. With Sukarno's close 
relationship to the PKI a known fact, these were potentially damaging 
revelations . 
Lt. Col. Untung, the commander of the palace guards and 
alleged mastermind of the coup attempt, had fled Djakarta in the last 
hours of the coup. A~er an extensive search, he was captured in 
Central Java on October 11, 1965. He went on trial on February 23, 
1966. Throughout the proceedings, the prosecution tried to create 
an image of Untung as an ambitious, gullible man who was willing to 
become a dupe of the PKI in exchange for personal aggrandizement. 
Untung's only line of defense was that he had acted to thwart a 
"Council of Generals. 1147 He was found guilty and sentenced to death 
on March 7, 1 966. The sentence was carried out in a military prison 
in West Java on September 28, 1967. 
46Hal Kosut, ed., The Sukarno Years (New York: Facts 
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During mid-1966 more guilty verdicts were handed down. 
Lt. Ngadimo, a communist army officer was sentenced to death in 
April, 1966. The commandant of Halim Field, headquarters for the 
plotters, Major Sujono, was next, being sentenced to death in June, 
1966. Aseli, a PKI organizer, learned his fate in August, 1966. 
With each new guilty verdict, the military felt that Sukarno's credi-
bility was being diminished. At the same time, General Suharto 
moved to increase the military's prestige by freeing 15 prominent 
48 politicians who had been incarcerated by Sukarno. Most of these 
individuals were well-known figures who had been associated with 
political organizations that had been outlawed by Sukarno. The 
charges brought against the men had been "a dislike of Guided 
Democracy." The military hoped that this action would put them-
selves into the position of being considered humanitarians while at 
the same time portraying Sukarno as an unfeeling dictator. 
During these early trials, the prosecution repeatedly tried 
to get the defendants to implicate Sukarno or at least his top subordi-
nates in the planning, execution, and cover-up of GESTAPU. In this 
maneuver, however, they were not successful. All the defendants 
steadfastly maintained they had only been working for the good of the 
Indonesian "state.'' All the defendants stated they were merely 
48New York Times, May 18, 1966, p. 8. 
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operating to "serve" the Great Leader of the Revolution (Sukarno). 
Major Sujono was typical: 11Without Bung Karno, the revolution cannot 
be completed and President Sukarno cannot be replaced by another. "49 
Couched in these terms, their testimony only indirectly suggested 
Sukarno's responsibility in his role as head of state. The military 
prosecutors felt it was impossible to connect Sukarno to the plotters 
on the basis of such weak, inconclusive evidence. 
While the early trials were in session, Sukarno made 
numerous public appearances in which he refuted any suggestion that 
he was in league with the plotters. As early as two weeks a~er the 
coup attempt, Sukarno promised to find the "true roots" of 
GESTAPU. 50 These appearances were planned to keep Sukarno's 
charismatic personality in the public eye while at the same time 
mitigating the growing influence of the military. This pattern of 
speaking out against any new disclosure was to continue right up 
until the termination of Sukarno's power in March, 1967. Indeed, 
in a speech less than three months before his removal from office, 
Sukarno said, "Some people have asked me to keep quiet and not make 
any speeches. But I cannot be quiet. When I feel I should support, 
49New York Times, May 30, 1966, p. 2. 
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I will support. I am the Great Leader of the Revolution and I will lead 
the revolution according to my own conviction. " 51 In the early days of 
the post-GESTAPU era, such rhetoric was accepted. Later it would 
not be. 
Because these minor figures had failed to produce the 
necessary evidence to implicate Sukarno, the prosecution felt it was 
ti.me to move against his major subordinates. Those selected for 
special attention by the military included Finance Minister Josef 
Mustafa Dalam, the Deputy Premier of Indonesia, Dr. Subandrio, 
and Air Force Chief of Staff Omar Dhani. It was felt that by attacking 
the major associates of President Sukarno that the military could sway 
public opinion to the extent that Sukarno would be forced to resign. 
It was in this spirit that the military announced the trial of Dalam in 
late August, 1966. 
Major Personalities - Dalam 
Josef Mustafa Dalam had been the chief financial officer 
under President Sukarno. As such, he was in a crucial position to 
observe the monetary manipulations of the Sukarno regime. It was 
this area of malfeasance that the military sought to bring to public 
attention. It was felt that if Dalam's fiscal juggling, as well as some 
51 New York Times, January 1, 1967, p. 31 . 
personal indiscretions could be associated with Sukarno, public 
credibility in the regime would suffer accordingly. The indictments 
against Dalam bore out this decision. 
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Article I of the indictments charged that between 1964 and 
1966, Dalam had attempted to disrupt the governmental fiscal struc-
ture as well as the Indonesian economy in general. It was alleged 
that he did this in several ways. First, it was suggested that Dalam 
issued import licenses totalling $270 million on special deferred 
payment plans. It was contended that such actions led to a deficit in 
Indonesia's international balance of trade. Second, it was suggested 
that Dalam granted special credits to friends that led to a deficit in 
the state budget. Finally, Dalam was charged with exacerbating the 
staggering inflation rate by printing more bank notes, thus increasing 
the amount of currency in circulation. 
Article II charged that Dalam had imported, without proper 
license, firearms from Czechoslovakia. It was suggested by the 
military that these weapons ( 400 submachineguns, 1 , 000 pistols and 
ammunition) were destined to be used to arm the "fi.~h force" move-
ment of the PKI suggested by Aidit. (Seep. 29.) Such a connection 
would have indeed been injurious to Sukarno because his relationship 
with the PKI was such public knowledge. If such allegations could be 
proven, it would appear that Sukarno had been involved in an intrigue 
to create an alternative to the military. 
52 
Article III also dealt with Dalam's purported monetary 
mismanagement. It was charged that he embezzled 1 O mill ion rupiahs 
in government funds which were transferred with Sukarno's approval 
to a special "Fund of the Revolution." It was further charged that this 
money was later "loaned" to six private business concerns that paid 
an exorbitant interest rate to Dalam for the privilege of the "loan." 
Article IV charged Dalam with having six wives as opposed 
to the four considered legal by Islamic cannon. Indeed, it was soon 
apparent that the prosecution was as keenly interested in Article IV 
as it was in the rest of the indictments. 
As the trial unfolded, it was obvious that the military sought 
to present spectacular revelations in order to stun the Indonesian 
people with the crassness of the present regime. The highlight of the 
Dalam trial came with the testimony of Dalam's girlfriends and their 
52 
tales of his lavish gifts to them. Titiek Puspa, a 29 year old 
actress, told of Dalam's gift of a new American-made automobile. 
A 22 year old actress, Tina Wowanrutu, topped this earlier testimony 
by relating how Dalam had given her two cars in return for her favors. 
The most sensational testimony, however, was reserved for Ida 
Auboedah, an 18 year old school-girl, who claimed to have married 
Dalam by proxy in 1965. As a wedding gift, she reportedly received 
52New York Times, September 4, 1966, p. 3. 
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a new house just six months prior to GESTAPU in March, 1965. 
Using these new disclosures, the military prosecutors repeatedly 
sought to portray Dalam as a lecherous public servant who thought 
only of his own well-being. It was hoped that some association could 
be constructed with Sukarno's rather glamorous, opulent life-style. 
The implication was that Dalam was nothing more than a cheap 
imitation of Sukarno. 
The defense was no match for the well constructed 
government case. In a weak, feeble rebuttal, Dalam admitted to his 
polygamy (Article IV) but said that he was only acting on "orders from 
higher ups" on the other charges. Throughout the trial he steadfastly 
refused to name these higher authorities. As regards the embezzle-
ment charge, Dalam said that Sukarno was in charge of the operation 
of the "Fund of the Revolution." According to Dalam, only Sukarno 
had the power to disburse funds. On the charge of issuing improper 
licenses and other government documents, Dalam contended that he 
only acted on requests signed by Sukarno, or the Deputy Premier 
Subandrio. He stated that he seldom even looked at the requests 
personally, usually leaving them to his underlings instead. (Such a 
remark might have had the reverse effect on the tribunal, however, 
because while it absolved Dalam of the embezzlement charge, it could 
leave him open to a charge of irresponsibility in public office.) 
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Dalam was found guilty on September 9, 1966 of the four 
counts listed in the indictments. In declaring a penalty of death, the 
Chief Justice of the Tribunal stated that the verdict was "clearly 
supported by the prosecution's case. 1153 In passing sentence the 
Chief Justice commented that Dalam deserved no leniency because 
throughout the trial he had shown no regret for his actions and that he 
was guilty of contempt of court because of his unwillingness to supply 
answers to the prosecution's questions as to the purported "higher 
ups. 1154 In retrospect, the verdict is certainly open to debate because 
most of the state's case was based on unsubstantiated, circumstantial 
evidence such as the testimony of Dalam's girlfriends. 
Public reaction to the Dalam verdict varied. The military 
felt it had been able to connect Sukarno to the extravagance and 
corruption of Dalam by implying that Sukarno had approved in advance 
Dalam's illegal activities. Other groups, notably the student organi-
zations, viewed the outcome differently. These groups were unhappy 
that the trial had centered on Dalam's sexual exploits rather than 
getting to the real issue of economics. Viewing the trial as a "staged 
comedy" with little real significance, Kami Djaya, a student publi-
cation said, "The people's hope that their sense of justice would be 
53New York Times, September 1 O, 1966, p. 1 . 
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satisfied has been shattered. 1155 The Action Command of Indonesian 
Students demanded to know "why there were attempts to distract court 
proceedings in another direction whenever the name of President 
Sukarno was mentioned. 1156 All of these statements tended to reflect 
a lack of faith in Suharto and his new regime. As Is mid Hadad, a 
student leader said, "There is no new order as a force yet. It is still 
just a climate. The old order is a weakening force. Once the central 
figure is out, then it will be easy. 1157 Throughout the trial, the 
central figure remained silent, not willing to comment or pass judg-
ment on his friend. The military, however, was not so reticent in 
its actions. 
Major Personalities - Subandrio 
Relatively pleased with the outcome of the Dalam trial, on 
October 1, 1966 the military opened the trial of Dr. Subandrio, the 
Deputy Premier of Indonesia and Sukarno's chief protege for more 
than nine years. It was more than mere coincidence that the mi.l itary 
chose the first anniversary of the coup attempt to try the most power-
ful of Sukarno's subordinates. At this point the military felt the 
55New York Times, September 4, 1966, p. 9. 
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initiative was with them. It was hoped that a conviction of Subandrio, 
coming close on the heels of the Dalam verdict, would push Sukarno's 
popularity with the masses even lower, thereby assuring a military 
victory in the struggle for the mantle of political leadership in 
Indonesia. Again, the verdict was a foregone conclusion. Even before 
opening statements had been heard, the mi. l i.tary sought to characterize 
Subandri.o as a durno; a character of the wayang kulit who gives bad 
information to his ruler and thus is an evil, untrustworthy servant. 
As early as March, 1966, the military had implied that Subandri.o 
was the mastermind of GESTAPU in its official publications. 58 The 
tribunal was so convinced of Subandrio's guilt that two weeks before 
the trial even began, the presiding Chief Justice said, "It should take 
us about 12 days to convict him. 1159 All that was needed was for 
Subandrio to provide the crucial testimony that would link Sukarno 
to GESTAPU. 
The indictments against Subandrio, as had been the charges 
against Dalam, were deliberately worded in a vague manner. This had 
a two-fold purpose. First, and most obviously, the military sought to 
make things as difficult as possible for the defense by never specifically 
680. G. Roeder, "Land of Smiles," Far Eastern Economic 
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enumerating the charges against the defendant. Second, the military 
hoped that Subandrio would try to save himself by directly naming 
Sukarno in the events of September 30 - October 1 , 1965. When made 
public, the reaction of many responsible groups in Indonesian society 
was one of general rejection and displeasure. This was particularly 
true of the student groups who characterized Subandrio as a greedy, 
self-centered public servant with little regard for the common man. 60 
The indictments against Subandrio purported that he: 
1. Was a mainstay in the planning and execution of the 
events of GEST APU. 
2. Had embezzled more than $500,000 in government 
funds and then diverted this state revenue for 
personal use. 
3. Subverted efforts to restore order in the wake of the 
defeat of the coup attempt. 
Subandrio pleaded innocent to the charges brought against him. 
The state's case basically sought to link Subandrio (and 
through him, Sukarno) with selling out to the Chinese communists. 
Particularly damaging to Subandrio's defense was the testimony of 
two of his closest subordinates. His personal secretary Hartono, 
stated that Subandrio took $500, 000 meant to cover expenditures at 
60Hughes, Indonesian Upheaval, p. 270. 
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the upcoming Afro-Asian Conference and banked the money for his own 
uses. Hartono further testified that Subandrio had sent him on a 
secret mission in February, 1965 to transfer the money to an unnum-
bered account in Geneva, Switzerland. Statements such as these 
tended to confirm the state's allegations of fiscal mismanagement on 
Subandrio's part. (Later, during the defense stage of the proceedings, 
Subandri.o claimed he had diverted the money to save it for a planeta-
rium for "all the people. 1161 Such an explanation only brought more 
sarcastic rebuttals from the prosecution.) 
Equally injurious to Subandrio's case was the testimony of 
Suwito Kusumowidagdo, the First Deputy Foreign Minister. In 
testimony before the tribunal on October 10, 1966, Suwito stated that 
Subandrio had conspired with Air Marshall Dhani (later a key 
defendant) to secretly transport Chinese-made weapons for the pro-
posed "fifth force" of the PKI into Indonesia without the knowledge of 
62 
the Minister of Defense, General Nasution. The inference to be 
drawn from such a statement is obvious. Whi.le Suwito was merely 
interpreting his own thoughts, the military tribunal was undoubtedly 
swayed by his statement. The implication is as follows: Subandrio 
was a close associate of Sukarno. Sukarno was favorable to the PKI 
6 1 Hughes, Indonesian Upheaval, p. 247. 
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and reportedly sympathetic to the creation of a party-sponsored 
para-military capability for the FKI. Hence, since Subandrio was 
in charge of procuring weapons for this unit, Sukarno undoubtedly 
was aware of the acti.vi.ti.es of hi.s subordinate. If he did, he was 
guilty of complicity. If not, he should be discharged from his office 
on grounds of negligence. While such a conclusion is highly circum-
spect, in the emotion reaction to GESTAPU, it was entirely possible 
that this was how the military interpreted Suwi.to's testimony. This 
feeling was given added credence when the state was able to produce 
yet another witness, Kartono Kadri, a former section chief of the 
Central Intelligence Board who claimed to have seen Subandrio destroy 
a letter to Sukarno from Ai.dit which outlined how Sukarno could create 
the "fi~h force" with weapons secretly purchased from the People's 
Republic of China. 63 Kartono said the letter was burned "because it 
concerned something i.n the past and because it involved President 
Sukarno. "64 This letter was to become the first concrete evidence 
of Sukarno's involvement in the coup attempt. 
Another segment of the indictment dealt with Subandrio's 
alleged subversion of attempts to restore order following the coup. 
630. G. Roeder, "Out of Time," Far Eastern Economic 
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The state contended that Subandrio tried to divert attention from 
himself and Sukarno a~er October 1, 1965 by claiming a British-
American plot to attack Indonesia in late 1965. To pursue this point 
further, the prosecution introduced into evidence a curious document 
known as the "Gilchrist letter." Thi.s letter was allegedly a paper 
written by Sir Andrew Gilchrist, the former British ambassador 
to Indonesia purporting to outline a joint British-American plot, 
"together with some local army friends" to overthrow the Sukarno 
regime. The letter reportedly found its way into Subandrio's posses-
sion in his capacity as the chief of intelligence in March, 1966 when 
he received a copy of the report along with a brief detailing how the 
document had been "found" in the Djakarta home of one William Palmer, 
an American businessman representing the Motion Picture Export 
Association in Indonesia. According to the Communist Youth League 
members who uncovered the plot, Palmer was an operative of the 
American Central Intelligence Agency who had fled Indonesia fearing 
his discovery. When asked what he did wi.th the letter, Subandrio later 
testified that he kept it a secret, wanting "only to use the document in 
the international arena against the British. 1165 When queried as to 
whether he had shown the report to Sukarno, Subandrio testified that 
he had, but that Sukarno had wanted to keep it a secret until the second 
65shaplen, Time Out of Hand, p. 98. 
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Afro-Asian Conference scheduled for June, 1965. At that meeting, 
Sukarno hoped to embarass the British and Americans by distributing 
copies of the letter to all the delegates assembled. (The conference, 
as i.t turned out, was never convened.) Both men, however, i.n 
speeches made pri.or to the coup attempt, hi.nted at "evidence of an 
i.mperiali.st plot to destroy Indonesia. 1166 Yet, neither Sukarno nor 
Subandri.o ever specifically mentioned the Gilchrist correspondence 
i.n public, bei.ng content to merely hint at its existence. 
It was the mi.litary's contention that the letter was a total 
fabrication, probably the product of the CIB that Subandrio headed. 
The prosecution expressed its belief that the letter was an attempt by 
Subandrio and Sukarno to provide themselves with an "out" if the coup 
attempt proved abortive. The military also strongly hinted that the 
letter had been prepared in collaboration with the PKI with whom 
Subandrio had allegedly formed at least a tacit alliance on the question 
of the "fi.~h force." This relationship was given further substance 
when the prosecution repeatedly brought up Subandri.o's burning of the 
letter from Aidit to Sukarno. 
With the proceedings in a critical state of balance, the 
prosecution produced yet another bombshell. This was a document 
purported to be Ai.dit's "confession" made just prior to his execution 
661 bid. ' p. 99. 
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by government troops in November, 1965. Quoting the Japanese dai.ly 
Asahil Shimbun, the "confession" read in part as follows: 
I, Aidit, have the highest responsibility for the 
September 30 incident. The incident was supported by other 
leaders of the party and leaders of mass organizations asso-
ciated with the party. Dissatisfaction with the present setup 
was the basic starting point for the coup d'etat. I thought that 
if a national unification government was established under the 
communist party leadership, the state would recover, the 
people's livelihood would improve .... I planned to effect 
closer relations with China economically too, if the coup 
d'etat proved successful. 67 
Several implications can be gleaned from this statement. 
First, the confession apparently exonerated Sukarno and placed the 
onus for GESTAPU clearly on the shoulders of the PKI and its chair-
man, Aidit. Second, in giving his motives for the coup attempt, in 
his statement Aidit makes no mention of a reactionary "Council of 
Generals." By merely alluding to "dissatisfaction" with the present 
regime, he leaves the door open for a myriad of interpretations. This 
would lend credibility to the mili.tary's claims while at the same ti.me 
further damaging the image of the PKI. Third, by hinting that closer 
relations with Red China would have followed had the coup been 
successful, the "confession" conveniently turns an internal matter 
into an international one, again deflecting the spotlight of public 
67 
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scrutiny from Subandrio and Sukarno. In the state's thinking, the 
"confession" provided a neat conclusion to an extremely complex 
problem. 
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It was precisely this simplicity that the military prosecutors 
sought to attack. Government witnesses present at the execution 
admitted that Aidit talked freely before his death. The substance of 
his conversations is debatable, however, as only military men were 
present. It would have been very convenient for Aidit to assume all 
the responsibility for GESTAPU at the hour of his death. It would also 
be convenient for Subandrio and Sukarno as well. Too convenient in 
fact. Accordingly throughout the trial, the military sought to use the 
"confession," not as an indication of Subandrio's innocence but rather 
just the opposite; that the "confession" was the result of some pre-
arranged Faustian deal between Aidit and Subandrio to save themselves 
in the event the coup failed. What incentive they might have offered is 
simply a matter of speculation. By repeatedly bringing to mind the 
relationship between Aidit and Sukarno the military further sought to 
implicate the President in the illicit deal. While the argument is 
tenuous at best, one must remember the environment in which this 
evidence was presented. Operating in a military courtroom, with a 
tribunal of ardent, anti-communist officers, in a country wracked by 
deep seated social prejudices, the contention that Aidit's "confession" 
was a fabrication was ideal to the military' s strategy. While the 
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document may have indeed been val id, the very thought of its lack of 
authenticity cast aspersions on Subandrio and through him, Sukarno. 
This was brought home in the testimony of General Edhy' s 68 aide who 
remarked, "Communists may talk, but good communists never 
69 
confess." In the end, it was enough to condemn Subandrio. 
The state's case against Subandrio was admittedly weak. 70 
For the most part, the prosecution's evidence was purely circum-
stantial which at best proved Subandrio's negligence but certainly not 
his complicity with the PKI or his involvement in illegal activities. 
Indeed, on the basis of the evidence presented, the worst "crime" 
Subandrio might have committed was to have been lax in his duties as 
the head of state security by not checking out thoroughly the so-cal led 
"Gilchrist letter." 
As has been said above, the evidence in the Subandrio trial 
was weak and inconclusive. The most convincing pieces of evidence 
presented by the prosecution were excerpts from public speeches made 
by Subandrio during the months before and after the coup attempt. It 
was the prosecution's contention that these speeches contained off-hand 
68General Sarwo Edhy was the officer given charge of the 
anti-communist campaign by General Suharto. 
69Hughes, Indonesian Upheaval, p. 167. 
70oonald Kirk, "Indonesia's Revolutionary Justice," 
New Leader 49 (November 7, 1966), pp. 3-5. 
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references that showed the depth of Subandrio's involvement in the 
coup attempt. The following examples are indicative of the type of 
statements asserted by the prosecution to be concrete proof of 
Subandrio's complicity in GESTAPU. 
Nine months prior to the coup attempt, Subandrio gave 
an exclusive interview to the government news agency, Antara. In 
this interview, Subandrio made the following statement, "Don't be 
surprised if at a certain time we leave those behind who were our 
comrades-in-arms because they don't understand the revolutionary aims 
and have become counterrevolutionary. 1171 The prosecution pointed 
to this statement as evidence that Subandri.o was involved with persons 
or groups unknown to overthrow the existing government. On the 
basis of previously presented testimony, the state strongly hinted that 
the mysterious party was the PKI. In his defense, Subandrio con-
tended that he was only trying to appeal to the nationalistic fervor 
of the masses to confront the massive social and economic woes of 
Indonesia. He stated that by "counterrevolutionary" he was not 
referring to any specific group but was only trying to bring to public 
awareness those individuals who wished to slow down the pace of 
l t . . I d . 72 revo u lon ln n ones1a. 
71 I bid. , p. 4. 
72Ibid., p. 5. 
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A second selection chosen by the prosecution to show 
Subandrio's guilt was taken from an interview he gave to a Djakarta-
based Muslim newspaper. In this article, Subandrio was quoted as 
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saying, "Don't be surprised if some of our former friends fall." 
The state asserted that this reference, when coupled with the first 
stated above, definitely showed that Subandrio was plotting to effect 
drastic change in Indonesia's political leadership. In his defense, 
Subandrio retorted that he was simply "leaking" the news that a 
shake-up in the Cabinet was imminent. As it turned out, Subandrio's 
predictions were accurate as in March and April, 1965 several high 
echelon government officials were dismissed because of their oppo-
sition to Sukarno's excessive Konfrontasi policy against Malaysia. 74 
A final example comes from a speech Subandrio delivered 
to a group of pro-communist studen~ in August, 1965 a little more 
than a month before the coup attempt. In this address, Subandrio is 
quoted as saying, "You must fight terror with counter-terror. 1175 
The military claims that this statement shows that Subandrio knew of 
a coup plot and was forewarning his pro-communist colleagues of the 
necessity to be ruthless and vengeful when the appointed hour comes. 
73Ibid., p. 5. 
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shaplen, Time Out of Hand, p. 86. 
75Ibid., p. 89. 
Subandrio replied that he was only warning of the consequences of 
using terror to solve social problems, not advocating it. The state 
replied that the speech was aimed at "creating unrest and disunity" 
among the people for the purpose of personal political gain. 76 
When studying these quotes there is little to suggest the 
conclusions drawn by the mi. litary. Granted they do express a sense 
of dissension wi.thi.n the government but they hardly show that 
Subandri.o was involved with the PKI. However, just as i.n the case 
of the Gilchrist letter and the Ai.dit "confession," the quotes were 
enough to convince the already biased tribunal of Subandrio's guilt. 
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Now it was the defense's turn. Staffed by a battery of 
civilian attorneys, the defense put together a strong case i.n 
Subandri.o's behalf. In its opening statements, the defense attempted 
to have the case thrown out on a jurisdictional technicality. The 
defense argued that the military tribunal was "incompetent" to try 
the defendant as he still was a member of the Cabinet (Subandrio had 
never relinquished his official positions) and could thereby only be 
tried in the Indonesian Supreme Court according to Indonesian law. 77 
Sitting in special emergency session, the Supreme Court rejected the 
motion, ruling that under the present circumstances the military 
76Ibi.d., p. 91. 
77 New York Ti.mes, October 2, 1966, p. 10. 
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court was the proper juri.sdi.cti.on. In its brief on the matter, the 
Supreme Court ordered the trial to reconvene on October 3, 1965. 
At the outset of the trial, Subandri.o had vehemently denied 
the charges lodged against him. Now, with the hope of a qui.ck verdict 
of acquittal gone, Subandri.o began to recant many of his initial state-
ments. Yes, he admitted, he had known of a deal with Red China to 
arm 100, 000 workers and peasants with weapons brought into the 
country illegally. 78 On the charge of covering up the coup attempt, 
Subandrio admitted that he was told on September 15, 1965 that there 
would be an attempted coup on the 19th. He also acknowledged that he 
had heard rumours of a "Council of Generals 11 but that he had di.s-
missed them as "groundless." When queried as to whether he had 
ever approached Sukarno with these reports, Subandrio replied that 
he had been reluctant to do so because he "felt the President knew 
more than he di.d. 1179 
Suddenly taking the offensive again, Subandrio launched into 
a bitter denunciation of the prosecution at this point. The state had 
misinterpreted his actions, Subandri.o explained. Describing himself 
78"The Man on Trial: Subandrio," Time, October 14, 
1966' p. 44. 
79NewYorkTi.mes, October4, 1966, p. 4. 
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as a "single fighter," Subandrio denied any association with the 
PKI. 80 As he said, "The Communist Party was in dee l i.ne. To attach 
myself to i.t would have been political suicide. If it had ever come to 
power, I do not know whether I would have ever seen the sun again. 11 81 
On the question of his role i.n GESTAPU, Subandrio again reiterated 
his innocence. Explaining the need for leadership in any great social 
movement, Subandrio commented, 11 I am too small a man. I would 
like to become a great man but I cannot. 1182 On this poignant note, 
Subandri.o began his summation. 
Perhaps Subandrio realized the futility of his efforts for the 
first ti.me. Perhaps i.t was simply a sense of weariness. In a clear, 
resonant voice, Subandri.o threw himself on the mercy of the court. 
He said, 
I feel gratified to have been briefly before this tribunal, 
because I feel like a human being again after having been 
regarded as the scum of society for a year. Whatever the 
verdict, I will accept it. I believe the verdict will not be pro-
nounced by individuals but whispered by God to the judges. 83 
Wi.th these few simple words Subandrio completed his defense and was 
silent. 
80New York Ti.mes, October ~8, 1966, p. 8. 
81 Ibid., p. 8. 
82oonald Kirk, "Indonesia's Revolutionary Justice," 
New Leader 49 (November 7, 1 966), pp. 3-5. 
83New York Ti.mes, October 18, 1966, p. 8. 
Subandrio was found guilty and sentenced to death on 
October 25, 1966. The state argued that because Subandrio had 
"brought tragedy to Indonesia and misery to all layers of the 
community," there was little reason for a lenient sentence. 8 4 
Describing Subandrio as a hypocrite who likes to pretend, Chief 
Justice Lt. Col. Ali Said called Subandrio, "a defendant with a very 
strong memory when the facts were in his favor but forgetting when 
circumstances might damage his case. 1185 When informed of the 
sentence, Subandrio stated that while Indonesian law provided for an 
automatic appeal of a death sentence, for the good of Indonesia, he 
would not do so. Thus, loyal and true to the end, Subandrio refused 
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to place Sukarno in the ponderous position of having to make a decision 
between political expendiency and personal friendship. It would be 
interesting to speculate on what might have happened had Subandrio 
chosen to appeal his conviction. 
At this point, some analysis of the proceedings would appear 
in order. There can be no doubt that the Subandrio trial had a pro-
found impact on Indonesian history. For one thing, Subandrio's 
sentence dramatizes the end of the pro-communist, pro-Peking period 
84New York Times, October 26, 1966, p. 4. 
85oonald Kirk, "Indonesia's Revolutionary Justice," 
New Leader 49 (November 7, 1966), pp. 3-5. 
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in Indonesian history. What the purges started, the Subandrio trial 
ended. Yet what of the military's efforts to discredit Sukarno through 
the trials of hi.s subordinates? Viewed from this perspective, the 
Subandrio trial must be seen as a major disappointment to the military. 
Nowhere did the military obtain a direct statement about Sukarno's 
involvement. At the outset, it was hoped that Sukarno would volun-
tarily testify at the trial. This did not occur, however, because to do 
so would have left Sukarno vulnerable to hostile cross-examination. 
Instead, Sukarno's written testimony, answering questions provided 
by the prosecution was read into the official transcript. His testimony 
can be summarized as follows: 
1 . Sukarno stated that he had only ordered Njoto (a high 
ranking PKI official) to return from Central Java in 
order to assist him in writing his speech presented on 
Independence Day, August 17, 1965. The state had 
previously hinted that Sukarno had recalled Njoto in 
order to finalize plans for the attempted coup. 
2. Sukarno replied that he had not received any information 
from Subandrio on increased PKT activity prior to 
September 30 -October 1, 1965. (This would appear to 
be in keeping with Subandrio's statement that he thought 
Sukarno had already been informed of this matter.) 
3. Sukarno responded that he had heard rumours of a 
"Council of Generals" prior to the coup attempt, but 
that when he discussed the matter with General Yani., 
his questions had been adequately answered. 
4. Sukarno contended that the coup had caught him 
completely off guard. 86 
Never did Subandri.o ever directly implicate his superior, 
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Sukarno. Granted, hi.s reference to "the need for a great man" might 
have inferred Sukarno. Likewise, his summation statement that, 
"all the Ministers wi.thout exception acted only as assistants to the 
President," might be taken to imply Sukarno's complicity. 87 Yet 
nowhere did Subandri.o use the opportunity given him by the vagueness 
of the indictments to save himself by naming Sukarno to anything even 
remotely connected wi.th GESTAPU. 
Even the guilty verdict in the Subandri.o case could not 
qui.et the ri.si.ng crescendo of discontent now beginning to be heard 
from various segments of Indonesian soci.ety. Particularly vocal were 
the student groups who referred to the Subandrio trial as a "staged 
comedy" and repeated their demands for an investigation into 
860. G. Roeder, "Out of Ti.me," Far Eastern Economic 
Review 54 (October 20, 1966), pp. 117-119. 
87
New York Ti.mes, October 20, 1966, p. 4. 
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Sukarno's role in GESTAPU. The students went so far as to invade 
the Presidential palace chanting "Court-martial Sukarno!" on three 
separate occasions. 88 With the failure of the Subandrio trial to turn 
the spotlight on Sukarno, the military announced the indictments of 
another chief Sukarno assistant, Air Marshall Omar Dhani.. The 
military anxiously hoped that the Dhani. trial would provide the 
elusive link i.t needed to associate Sukarno with GESTAPU. It was 
in this frame of mind that the military opened the trial of Dhani on 
December 5, 1966. 
Major Personal iti.es - Dhani 
The charge leveled against Dhani in the indictments was for 
his complicity i.n the events of September 30 -October 1, 1965. In 
comparison to the vagueness of the charges in the Dalam and Subandri.o 
trials, the indictment against Dhani. was much more specific and to the 
point. Several interpretations of the mil i.tary' s motives are possi.b le. 
Perhaps the military was becoming bored with the legal maneuverings 
and simply wished to get the trial over with as soon as possible. More 
probable, however, i.s the interpretation that the military was beginning 
to feel the pressures exerted by the students to bring Sukarno to 
justice. By using vague terms, the military had assured itself a guilty 
88 11The Man on Tri.al: Subandrio," Ti.me, October 14, 1966, 
p. 44. 
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verdict. Yet the convictions had not had the intended effect of 
displacing Sukarno. Therefore, i.t was entirely possible that the 
military opted for a more specific indictment that would bring about 
the desired response. In addition, a full disclosure of Sukarno's 
involvement could only add to the legitimacy of the military's quest 
to resolve the existing crisis in political leadership. In any event, 
Dhani was considered to know the most of any of the three major 
defendants about Sukarno's role in the coup attempt. As such, the 
Dhani trial was to differ si.gnifi.cantly from the previous two trials in 
that Dhani was not portrayed as a mastermind of GESTAPU but rather 
as a prominent player in its drama. 
Throughout the proceedings the prosecution attempted to 
portray Dhani as a naive man with a "mitty-like" dream of succeeding 
Sukarno as President had the coup been successful. 89 The state 
strongly implied that Dhani was a weak, gul li.ble man who was thor-
oughly manipulated by the PKI in their attempts to defeat the challenge 
of the military. His only attraction to the PKI, the prosecution argued, 
was that he controlled access to Halim fi.eld, the area selected to be 
the headquarters for the plotters. In response to the charge of having 
given opportunity and aid to the plotters, Dhani replied that, "I know 
89 Jerome R. Bass, "The PKI and the Attempted Coup," 
Journal of Southeast Asian Studies 1 (January, 1969), pp. 103-104. 
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now I was wrong in the actions I committed. But I never had any 
90 intention of overthrowing the government." Then Dhani added a 
curious comment stating that his only purpose in life was to "implant 
Bung's teachings in the Air Force" and to make all of his men "little 
Sukarnos. " Dhani. stressed that he had al ways believed he was 
91 fighting for the President and his country. This statement, perhaps 
added as an afterthought, was precisely what the military had been so 
futilely searching for. It was the comment that would bring down 
Bung Karno. 
As the trial progressed, it was obvious that Dhani was now 
a secondary figure destined to play out the shadowy drama conceived 
by the two protagonists, Suharto and Sukarno. The majority of the 
prosecution's questions did not even deal with Dhani.. Instead, the 
state sought to pin down witnesses as to Sukarno's role in the events 
at Halim after he arrived there on the morning of October 1 , 1965. 
Particularly damaging was the testimony of Heru Atmodjo, an enlisted 
man who described Sukarno as apparently congratulating Supardjo on 
90 
New York Times, December 6, 1966, p. 9. 
91New York Times, December 21, 1966, p. 7. 
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the success of the coup by slapping him on the shoulder. 92 According 
to the prosecution, this action could be interpreted as concrete proof 
of Sukarno's involvement. 
Yet, it was Dhani who ironically gave the testimony that was 
to cause Sukarno's downfall. During his cross-examination Dhani 
attempted to clarify some points regarding Sukarno's presence at 
Halim. While he resolutely refused to implicate Sukarno directly, 
his testimony nevertheless was crucial. According to Dhani, Sukarno 
had given at least tacit approval to the murders of the military officers 
on the PKI death list. When informed of the killings, Dhani recalled 
that Sukarno responded, "Good. This is an event in the revolution. 1193 
While Dhani stated that he did not know whether Sukarno had had any 
prior knowledge of the plans, he did say that Sukarno did not appear 
distraught at the news. When asked by a member of the tribunal if 
Sukarno had ever expressed any dissatisfaction with the plotters in 
94 Dhani 's presence, the defendant resolutely answered, "No." 
Coupled with the revelations of the "slapping incident" one can see how 
the ti.de was slowly turning in favor of the military. 
920. G. Roeder, "Trial by Proxy," Far Eastern Economic 
Review 54 (December 22, 1966), p. 587. 
93New York Times, December 7, 1966, p. 8. 
941 bid . ' p. 8 . 
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Si.nee the beginning of the Subandri.o trial, the prosecution 
had been agitating i.n the press for Sukarno to come forward and 
explain his role i.n GESTAPU. The subsequent i.niti.ati.on of charges 
against Dhani. had renewed this cry for information. Just as in the 
Subandri.o case, however, Sukarno di.stained a court appearance that 
would have exposed him to a strong cross-examination by the state. 
Now, with the damaging testimony of the Dhani trial made public, 
Sukarno sensed it was time to take the offensive in order to stem the 
mounting ti.de of public criticism. In a written deposition Sukarno 
stated the fol lowi.ng: 
1 • That Dhani. had spoken with him on the day prior to the 
coup (September 29, 1965) but that at no ti.me had they 
discussed the rumour of a "Council of Generals." 
(In his earlier testimony, Dhani had stated that the 
subject had indeed been a topic of conversation at that 
meeting.) 
2. That the coup had been a total surprise to him. In this, 
he reiterated his written testimony given at the time of 
the Subandri.o trial. 
3. That he had gone to Halim of his own free wi.11, not to 
associate with the plotters but to "confront" them. 
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4. That he had heard a "rumour" that several mi. litary 
officers had been killed in the coup attempt. To the 
specific details of this "rumour," Sukarno apologized 
that his memory was "faulty. 119,5 
In retrospect, this attempt by Sukarno seems feeble indeed. Taken 
as a counter-weight against the testimony presented at the trial, 
Sukarno's deposition appears shallow and unconvincing. 
The end was near for Dhani. In a final, desperate move, 
Dhani 's lawyers tried to save their client by inferring that he had only 
acted on orders "from above." Ra'den Soenario, one of Dhani's 
lawyers summarized the image the defense wanted to portray when 
he said in his closing statements, "The accused is a very loyal and 
good disciple of President Sukarno. I can only say that he is in fact 
a victim. 1196 At that point, however, any attempt at confession would 
have fallen on deaf ears. The tribunal was after bigger game than a 
vain, arrogant military officer. The military was sure of its case 
against Sukarno now. This heightened confidence was given even 
greater significance when the tribunal found Dhani guilty on 
December 24, 1966 and sentenced him to death. 
950. G. Roeder, "Trial by Proxy," Far Eastern Economic 
Review 54 (December 22, 1966), p. 587. 
96New York Times, December 22, 1966, p. 7. 
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When viewed in retrospect, there can be no doubt that the 
Dhani trial was by far the most damaging for Sukarno. Until this time, 
he had been able to explain away or brush off any suggestion of his 
involvement, relying heavily on his magnetic personality and relation-
ship with the masses. Now this relationship had been challenged. The 
testimony of the Dhani trial had raised questions such as the "slapping 
incident" that Sukarno had not anticipated. It was an action that could 
not be explained away. Sukarno was being forced to come up with 
specific informative answers to questions regarding his personal 
behavior. 
Likewise, the Dhani trial had initiated new pressures from 
all segments of society for an investigation of Sukarno's role in 
GESTAPU. Initially, only the student groups and action fronts had 
pushed for Sukarno to reveal his role. As a result of the Dhani trial, 
important leaders in the civilian sector began to press for a full 
disclosure by Sukarno. Speaking just three days a~er the guilty 
verdict in the Dhani case, a Djakarta-based association of Muslim 
groups called for Sukarno's resignation, describing him as a 
"destructive opposition" to Suharto's development of a new cabinet. 97 
The chairman of the Indonesian Lawyer's Association, commenting on 
the evidence presented at the Dhani trial, concluded Sukarno had 
97New York Times, December 27, 1966, p. 9. 
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encouraged the coup. According to him, since the others (Dalam, 
Subandrio, Dhani) had received the death sentence, "the same should 
apply to Sukarno. 1198 
It was apparent that the Dhani trial had been influential in 
garnering support for the military while at the same time destroying 
one of Sukarno's main bastions of support, the confidence of the 
masses. 
98 Hughes, Indonesian Upheaval, p. 277. 
CHAPTER VI 
THE TRIALS AND SUKARNO - II 
Sensing that the Dhani trial had succeeded in placing 
Sukarno on the defensive, the military now sought to continue its 
pressure through the prosecution of several lesser figures who could 
now directly tie Sukarno to the coup attempt. The military hoped that 
by gaining guilty verdicts against these lesser figures the public out-
rage would be so great that Sukarno would be forced either to make 
a damning public confession or resign outright. Regardless, the 
military would be the victor in the power struggle without appearing 
to have been the aggressor. Illustrative of the military's new strategy 
was the trial of General Mastafa Sjarif Supardjo which began in 
February, 1967. 
The Supardjo Trial 
General Supardjo was important to the military's overall 
strategy for several reasons. First, he was the leader of the pro-
gressive element in the military and as such, a key link between the 
discontented military factions and the communists. While one of the 
decorations Supardjo had received in his military career was for his 
role in defeating the communist coup attempt at Madiun in 1948, it was 
81 
82 
widely suspected that he was extremely pro-PK!. (This was borne out 
in testimony at the trial which appeared to show that Supardjo had been 
in close communication with Sjam, the chief deputy of Aidit, for 
99 . 
several months prior to October 1, 1965 .) Second, SupardJo was 
an arrogant, ambitious man who sought promotion rapidly. When 
advancement di.d not come fast enough to suit him, the prosecution 
contended that Supardjo was more than willing to associate himself 
with any movement that would assure him the rewards he desired. 
The state therefore desired to portray Supardjo as a totally repre-
hensible individual. It was expected that the public would completely 
turn against him. Thus, it was essential that some link between 
Supardjo and Sukarno be forged. The military did not have to wait 
long. 
Much of the testimony in the Supardjo trial was vague and 
confusing. In pursuing its indictment of conspiracy, the state sought 
to establish Supardjo's relationship with the other, already convicted 
conspirators. To this end, the state questioned Dhani and Lt. Col. 
Untung, the head of the palace guards who was generally recognized 
as the head of the coup movement in the military. Untung was of little 
help, denying that Supardjo was even part of the movement, implying 
99shaplen, Time Out of Hand, p. 101 • 
83 
contemptuously that Supardjo was only a willing dupe to be manipulated. 
Dhani 's testimony was more revealing. 
Dhani stated that since he himself was innocent, he would not 
have known if Supardjo was involved or not. Yet, according to Dhani, 
"I was never sure whether Supardjo was in command of the 
September 30th Movement or whether he received commands from 
someone else. 11100 The inference is obvious. True to form, Dhani 
had failed to make any incriminating statement. Yet, by even implying 
that "someone else" might have been involved, he gave the military the 
answer they wanted so desperately to hear. 
It was at this point that the state dropped a bombshell. The 
prosecution now revealed that Supardjo had been able to escape capture 
after the defeat of the coup attempt because he carried a letter of pro-
tection supposedly written by Sukarno. According to the prosecution, 
Supardjo received the letter authorizing his safe passage into the 
hinterlands while Sukarno and Supardjo were together at Halim on the 
morning of October 1. This letter, the prosecution charged, was the 
reason Supardjo had been able to resist arrest until he was spotted by 
government troops in January, 1967. 
The state alleged that Supardjo had used the letter given him 
by Sukarno to secure lodgings in his flight to avoid capture. To prove 
1 OONew York Times, February 26, 1967, p. 14. 
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this point, the state produced several witnesses. The first of these 
was former navy major, Suwardi. According to his testimony, 
Supardjo had lived in Suwardi 's home for a short period immediately 
after GESTAPU. Suwardi claimed that he did not know who Supardjo 
was, but that because he carried a letter from Bung Karna, he must 
have been an influential person. Accordingly, Suwardi. accommodated 
his distinguished but anonymous guest. 1 01 A second witness, a 
former PKI member, also referred to the letter ordering that 
"Supardjo be protected and given shelter. 11102 While the military 
was never able to concretely produce the letter or even provide con-
clusive evidence as to its existence (Samsi, the PKI member, had 
testified that he never actually "saw" the letter), the implication was 
too conclusive. Coming on the heels of the revelations from the 
previous trials, it was now at least conceivable that Sukarno had 
known of and approved the coup attempt. Even while Supardjo was 
pleading in vain that he had never known of such a document, the 
military was preparing to lay the basis of its New Order that would 
lead to the resolution of the problem of political change in Indonesia. 
When the guilty verdict was returned against Supardjo on March 13, 
1967 much more than a dissident military officer had been found guilty. 
101 New York Ti.mes, March 1, 1967, p. 4. 
102Ibid., p. 4. 
85 
The End of Sukarno 
The displacement of Indonesian President Sukarno in 1967 
represents a major turning point in the history of Southeast Asia. It 
stopped the ascendency of the PKI within Indonesia. It halted, then 
reversed Indonesia's close ties with Communist China. It allowed 
contending political parties to once again bloom i.n Indonesia. It 
rehabilitated the Indonesian economy, long stagnant under Sukarno. 
Perhaps even more important than these considerations, however, 
is that the displacement of Sukarno provides an insight into how one 
country resolved a crisis in political leadership. 
There are three well-defined stages of Sukarno's demise 
. 
in the days following GESTAPU. During the period October 1, 1965 
to March 11, 1966, Sukarno attempted to restore pre-coup tranquility 
in Indonesia. In the days immediately following the coup attempt 
Sukarno was pressured by the military to explain his role in the 
events of September 30 - October 1 . It must be remembered that at 
no ti.me during this period did Sukarno ever once denounce the actions 
of the plotters or attempt to disassociate himself from the PKI. 
Indeed, Sukarno's biggest error during this ti.me was his attempt to 
hang on to his relationship with the PKI i.n the face of mounting 
pressure from the military. In statements reassuring the people 
immediately a~er October 1, 1965, Sukarno tried to soothe the fears 
of the masses by telling them that Indonesia was safe because 
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"Indonesia's is a Left Revolution. " 103 On February 14, 1966, Sukarno 
even went so far as to praise the PKI as "the only party which made 
considerable contributions and sacrifices for the independence of the 
country." 104 Statements such as these could only have served to 
di.vi.de Sukarno from portions of the population in the highly emotional 
state that then existed. He was able, however, to meet the initial 
challenge to his authority by using his charismatic appeal with the 
majority of the Indonesian masses. Speaking in a nation-wide radio 
broadcast i.n mid-January, 1966, Sukarno said, 
I am sick of the secret campaign being launched against 
me. I, Sukarno, as the Great Leader of the Revolution, the 
Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces, say whoever is 
still willing to follow me should rally behind me, defend me, 
build your strength. 105 
The tone in this speech is unmistakable. Sukarno was still the 
unquestioned favorite of the Indonesian masses. 
Sukarno appeared at this point to be playing a dangerous 
game. Believing that the people were still with him, Sukarno made 
two bold moves to re-establish his power base. In late February, 
1966, he reshuffled his Cabinet to include many pro-PK I, pro-Chinese 
103Justus M. van der Kroef, Indonesia After Sukarno 
(Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press, 1971), p. 18. 
104Ibid., p. 19. 
105Shaplen, Ti.me Out of Hand, p. 134. 
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members. One of the ministers deposed was General Nasution, the 
lone survivor of the death squads and symbol of the military's 
participation in politics. Indeed, the post of Minister for Aircraft 
Industry went to none other than Omar Dhani, who had been out of 
the country on a "special mission" for Sukarno and who had not yet 
been arrested. Sukarno, ever the idealist, described the changes 
as "just a normal reshuffle so my assistants can better help me carry 
on the revolution. " 106 The military did not take such a casual view, 
however. Suharto, who had retained his dual roles of Minister of the 
Army and Chief of Staff, was furious but held back his anger because 
he felt the time was not yet ripe to openly challenge Sukarno. 
On February 24, 1966, Sukarno alienated another segment 
of society when he banned the major student organization, the KAMI . 
Prior to the order, this group had been vocally advocating the removal 
of Subandrio, the banning of the PKI, and the lowering of prices to 
combat the rampant rate of inflation that had soared to 600 percent in 
late 1965. The students responded to Sukarno's order by openly 
demonstrating against the government. To deal with the problem, 
Sukarno ordered the military to disperse the students, with blood-
letting if necessary. While the military leadership was indignant over 
the Presidential order to "chase kids," the student demonstrations 
106Ibid., p. 138. 
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gave the mi li.tary the necessary leverage to demand more power to 
maintain civil order on March 11 , 1966. In li.ght of the fact that he 
had ordered the military into action in the first place, Sukarno could 
hardly refuse. 
March 12, 1966 to January 1 O, 1967 saw mounting criticism 
of Sukarno from all responsible segments of Indonesian soci.ety. On 
March 12, 1966 Sukarno finally agreed to formally ban the PKI as a 
political force in Indonesia. In retrospect, this attempt at conciliation 
came too late to be of any value. Sukarno had waited too long to 
renounce hi.s former associates. Immediately after the signing of the 
order banning the PKI, the military moved against the pro-PKI 
Gabi.net members. Clai.mi.ng to be acting for "their own safety," the 
mi. litary placed under house arrest such prominent government 
personalities as Subandri.o, Charul Saleh, the Thi.rd Deputy Premier, 
Major General Achmadi., the Information Mi.ni.ster, Minister of 
Elections Sumardjo and Lenin Pri.ze winner Peijono, the Minister of 
Education. A new Gabi.net, with General Suharto i.n charge of security 
and defense, was sworn i.n on March 27, 1966. 
Sukarno's world was crumbling on the i.nternati.onal front 
as well. On June 26, 1966 the People's Consultative Congress 
(MPRS) moved to end Sukarno's costly Konfrontasi. policy against 
Malaysi.a. This was finally accomplished on August 11, 1966, largely 
due to the negotiations of the new Forei.gn Mi.nister, Adam Malik. The 
endi.ng of the war with Malaysi.a must be considered a major blow to 
Sukarno's attempts to re-assert his power. 
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On July 25, 1966 still another Cabinet shake-up established 
the tripartite power structure that endures to the present time. 
Suharto was given the powers of head of state, the Sultan of Jogjakarta 
would be the First Deputy Prime Minister and Adam Malik, long an 
opponent of Sukarnoist ideology, would be the Foreign Minister. 
For all intents and purposes, the victory was now complete. 
What remained was the future of Sukarno. At this crucial juncture, 
Sukarno now made a totally uncharacteristic and ultimately fatal move. 
To counteract mounting public pressure, Sukarno attempted to divert 
attention from himself to a CIA plot to overthrow him. (See discus-
sion of the "Gilchrist letter," p. 60.) For the first time, Sukarno 
publically took the offensive against the military, claiming military 
involvement in the plot. To check-mate Sukarno's new aggressive 
posture, the military on December 21, 1966 came out publically as a 
defender ~f the Constitution and the status quo. This move was meant 
to reassure the public of the military's outwardly peaceful intentions 
toward Sukarno. By doing so, the military made Sukarno appear an 
aggressive challenger to the New Order of Suharto. 
For Sukarno, time had now run out. He sealed his own fate 
in a January 1 O, 1967 statement in which he criticized the leadership 
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of the MPRS for failing to recognize the "cunning of neokolim 
subversion" that was clouding their investigation of GESTAPU. 107 
Between January 11 , 1967 and March 12, 1 967, the MPRS 
sought to revoke Sukarno's presidential powers. On January 1, 1967, 
Sukarno had given his "answers" to questions regarding his involve-
ment in GEST APU. By this time, however, many of the groups in 
Indonesian society were extremely wary of hi.s statements. The out-
lawed student group, KAMI, for example, continued to agitate for 
Sukarno's ouster. He might have been able to weather this crisis 
as well had it not been for his statements of January 1 O, 1967 that 
convinced the MPRS to act for the "good of the state." On January 20, 
1967, the MPRS opened deliberations on the fate of Sukarno. 
In the midst of these discussions, a new element was added 
to the drama. Charging that, "Mr. Sukarno failed to act as indicated 
by the law in his position as head of state and Supreme Commander of 
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the Armed Forces," the Indonesian Supreme Court demanded that 
Sukarno be tried for treason on charges of embezzling state funds and 
complicity in the coup attempt. For Sukarno, the end had come. 
There was no rhetorical outburst to counter this final challenge. 
1°7New York Times, January 11, 1967, p. 7. 
108New York Times, February 2, 1967, p. 1. 
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On February 20, 1967 President Sukarno officially 
surrendered all governing powers to General Suharto in accordance 
with MPRS decree #15 of that date. Meeting on March 12, 1967 the 
MPRS legitimized the actions of February 20 and made moves to 
institute the New Order of President Suharto. The crisis in political 
leadership had finally been resolved. 109 
The Trials: A Preliminary Assessment 
The vital question is this: how was the military able to 
triumph over a seemingly invincible Sukarno? The answer to this 
question can be found in the typically Javanese manner employed by 
the military in their dealings with Sukarno. The military won out 
because it had not tried to form public opinion but only to follow the 
"apparent wishes" of the masses. 
In formulating its strategy against Sukarno, the military 
recognized several basic facts. The military was aware the PKI and 
Sukarno were wedded through the policy of NASOKOM into an unholy 
alliance directed at the military. Any action taken against one party 
would therefore be viewed as an attack on the other as well. Second, 
Sukarno had implicitly given his blessing to the PKI as his political 
heirs. His statements on the role of Aidit in Indonesian politics 
109The texts of these two MPRS statements appear in the 
appendix to this paper. 
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(seep. 18) as well as his seemingly le~ward dri~ toward the orbit of 
Red Chinese influence seemed to confirm this fact. Third, the military 
recognized that the PKI desired to eliminate the military as a political 
force in Indonesia and that if the PKI was allowed to continue opera-
ti.ans, this situation might become reality. Paramount, however, was 
the military's recognition of Sukarno's immense popularity with the 
masses. It was felt that in a direct confrontation, Sukarno's mass 
appeal would be the deciding factor with the military the loser. Thus, 
the military was forced into a typically Javanese strategy of attacking 
Sukarno through indirect means. To this end, the trials of suspected 
participants in GESTAPU played an integral role in the mi.litary's 
strategy for the displacement of Sukarno. 
The trials served several purposes. They exposed the 
corruption and inefficiency that existed in the Indonesian government. 
Finally, the glittering image generally associated with the Sukarno 
years had been stripped away to reveal a decayed, rotting infra-
structure. No longer could the ultramodern Hotel Indonesia blot out 
the tumble-down shacks of Djakarta. Similiarly, the trials discredited 
the PKT and the concept of the Marxist revolution in Indonesia, at least 
for the time being. 11 O Within the military itself, the trials provided a 
110According to some experts, notably Arnold Brackman, 
if the Suharto government cannot make real inroads into the economic 
woes of Indonesia, there is a good chance that the PKI may yet succeed. 
----------------------------,,~,,·,-· 
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rationale for purging its ranks of left-wing military officers by tying 
them to the coup attempt. In doing so, the Indonesian military 
reverted, at least temporarily, to its traditional conservative origins. 
The trials also served to establish the military as the defender of the 
"popular will." By such gestures as the freeing of political prisoners 
(see p. 48) the military created the image of the sympathetic public 
servant while detracting from Sukarno's image of the "Great Father." 
Most importantly, however, the trials undermined and finally 
destroyed Sukarno's legitimacy to govern by raising indirect questions 
that Sukarno was increasingly unable to answer to the satisfaction of 
the majority of groups in Indonesian society. The key word here is 
indirect. In this respect, the trials were an extension of the classic 
Javanese mentality. 
CHAPTER VII 
GESTAPU AND POLITICAL CHANGE 
As was stated in the initial chapter of this paper, the 
purpose of this research has been to provide a case-study of incidence 
of political change in a developing society. A fundamental consi.der-
ati.on has been left unanswered, however. That i.s, what constitutes 
poll.ti.cal change? What symbols, personalities, or i.nsti.tuti.ons must 
be manipulated in order for a crisis in political change to be resolved 
peacefully (assuming that thi.s is the desired goal). This final chapter 
will explore these questions and attempt to place into perspective the 
events i.n I ndonesi.a from October 1 , 1965 to March 12, 1967. 
Poli.ti.cal Change i.n Traditional Societies 
In a traditional society, the instruments of governing are 
highly visible to the average ci.ti.zen. The institutions of governing 
have evolved over a long period of time and have had their legitimacy 
inculcated into the value systems of the governed. It is a relatively 
simple, uncomplicated process. A king or some other princely 
personality fulfills the executive function. Presumably, this i.ndi.vi.dual 
rules with the di.vine approval of a deity that oversees the operations 
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of mortal men on earth. O~ times, the ruler i.s the physical 
manifestation of this supernatural being placed on earth. His words 
are law and his every action is deemed legitimate because of his 
exalted, pre-eminent position in society. Likewise, the legislative 
and judicial functions may be centered in a "council of elders" that 
has the same aura of legitimacy as the ruler. Indeed, in some tradi-
tional societies, all three functions may be centered in one institution, 
the ruler, thus creating a primitive form of autocracy. In such 
societies, the insti.tuti.ons of power are well defined. Likewise, the 
question of political change is a relatively simple one. The ruler di.es 
and is supplanted by another who inherits the mantle of legitimacy 
from his predecessor. Even when confl i.ct among pretenders does 
occur, it is usually confined to a small group of individuals, each with 
a varying interpretation of how the problem should be resolved. No 
matter who wins in such a situation, the mantle of legitimacy is kept 
relatively intact. Tradition has dictated the answer to the problem. 
Political Change in Developed Societies 
In a developed political system, political legitimacy is 
equally well defined. Constitutions, the manifestation of the Greek 
and Judeo-Christi.an traditions in government, spell out specifically 
the institutions that subsume political authority. Where the traditional 
system i.s diverse, the mature political system may be characterized 
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as specific. Developed political systems resolve conflict through 
socially acceptable channels. In democratic settings, candidates 
contest electoral positions, commissions and boards fill non-elective 
vacancies. In authoritarian systems, the selection process, while 
not as open as in a democratic society, is closely regulated by 
institutions of government to insure their smooth operations. In any 
developed political process there are standards of behavior required 
for any potential participant in the process. Any person exhibiting 
deviant behavior outside the accepted limits is considered an outcast 
to be excluded from participation. In such a manner the mature 
political system is able to insure its own perpetuity. 
Politi.cal Change in Developing Societies 
Transitional societies, such as those that achieved their 
independence after World War II do not fit into either of the afore-
mentioned categories. Indeed, life in a society torn between the 
security of the past and the promise of the future may be the most 
complex of all. Men do not willingly part with the past. Yet the 
model of development stands as a dream to be realized in order to 
be recognized as a world power. One will note no underdeveloped 
societies (with the possible exception of the People's Republic of 
China) that would classify as a world leader. Western political 
scientists have deemed the Western, industrialized model to be the 
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yardstick by which all states are measured. Those that fall short wish 
to catch up as quickly as possible, no matter what the cost involved. 
Just as social discontinuity in a transitional society can 
create a psychological dilemma for the average citizen, so also does 
a conflict in matters political. The transitional political process is 
uniquely unequipped to deal with society's massive problems. The 
lure of the past and the promise of the future create a political envi-
ronment incapable of achieving anything but the most trivial goals. 
Ancient symbols and institutions do not appear to have legitimacy in 
the space age. Likewise, the average citizen is so tied to the past 
that to attempt a break wi.th that past would create a psychological 
dichotomy so severe that one must question the worthiness of even 
trying. Thus, the society may well stagnate or even possibly regress, 
creating in the m-eantime even more seemingly insurmountable 
obstacles. 
The key to the problems of a transitional society is how 
political conflict is resolved. Drawing on a colonial mentality 
(particularly the Anglo-American tradition), the leaders of developing 
societies have learned that "participation" is central to a mature 
political process. Yet the institutions of governing they employ are 
not capable of handling the complex action of "choosing." Traditional 
ideology had always looked to the deity to supply political leadership. 
It was a process that excluded mortal men from participation. 
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Developed societies, on the other hand, have the trappings of 
government (legislature, judicial systems, executives, constitutions) 
to solve a crisis in political leadership. One needs only to consult 
the proper statute to find the answer. 
Transitional societies enjoy neither the mysticism of the 
past or the precision of the future. While power is present in various 
forms (charismatic leaders, political parties, interest groups, the 
military), legitimacy is o~en not congruent with the recognized 
institutions of government. Hence, transitional societies are caught 
up in a seemingly impossible situation of trying to resolve conflict in 
an environment that lacks the institutions to do so. This is precisely 
the contention of this research; that Indonesia, as a transitional 
society, was not able to resolve its crisis in political leadership 
because the institutions and symbols of power in Indonesia lacked 
legitimacy in the eyes of the average citizen. Political authority did 
not spring from the recognized organs of government. It came from 
elsewhere (the military, the PKI, and the personality of Sukarno). 
The remainder of this chapter will examine this contention as it 
applies to Indonesia and attempt to draw some conclusions about 
the significance of the Indonesian experience for other developing 
societies. 
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Indonesia: A Typical Developing Society 
The roots of contemporary Indonesian society run deep into 
its Javanese past. Throughout Indonesia one can find proud references 
to ancient Javanese empires that exerted a major influence over much 
of sea-girt Southeast Asia. Principal among these empires was the 
Mataram dynasty of the early seventeenth century. Early in the 
history of the Mataram period, the Sultan Agung restored the political 
unity of Java in a series of devastating campaigns that established the 
imperial capital near present day Jogjakarta. The political structure 
in Mataram ti.mes began and ended with the absolute authority. Since 
Mataram was an Islamic state, the king, while no longer explicitly a 
god-king, was still a sacral figure. According to legend, the ruler 
could be recognized by the wahyu (di.vine light) that either descended 
upon him or shone from his eyes. When the wahyu le~ the king, it 
was considered that his legitimacy to govern had been revoked. 
The early Javanese princes were obliged to fulfill certain 
functions in Mataram society. Basically, it was the ruler's solemn 
responsibility to maintain natural order in the kingdom, encompassing 
and reconciling any disturbances should they occur. That these func-
tions were held in high esteem in early Javanese society is indicated 
by several of the titles given the Mataram princes: Hamengku Buwono 
("He who holds the world on his lap") and Paku Buwono ("Axis of the 
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world"). Thus, it was the ruler who became the physical manifestation 
of power and political authority in ancient Indonesia. 
In many ways, Sukarno must be considered as the 20th 
century reincarnation of the Mataram princes. As Bernhard Dahm 
has pointed out, much of Bung Karno's personality was inherently 
Javanese. 111 Dahm fi.rst considers Sukarno's underlying belief in 
a cyclical view of history in which Indonesia's rulers are simply 
temporary phenomenon. This unique view of history implies an 
"inevitable" ending in which Indonesia's ruler was to be a Just Savior 
(Ratu Adil) who would establish a flourishing kingdom, bestowing upon 
its inhabitants prosperity, freedom from taxation, and houses built of 
stone. Such a prophecy came from the Djajabja tales of the Mataram 
period of which all Javanese youth are acutely cognizant. It is Dahm's 
contention that Sukarno felt himself to be the Ratu Adi.I of the anci.ent 
tales. 112 The fact that the prophecies told of a savior only lent 
credence to Sukarno's rationalization of his personal life-style as 
hi.s just due. 
Javanism was also at the base of Sukarno's ability to 
combine, synthesize, and submerge divergent, sometimes even 
111 Bernhard Dahm, Sukarno and the Struggle for Indonesian 
Independence (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1969), p. vi. 
112Ib'd .. 1 • , p. Vl 1. 
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opposite positions and groups into a curious unity of his own creation. 
Such a disavowal of conflict i.s deeply embedded i.n Javanese cultural 
traditions. Indeed, a basic core value of Indonesian society is con-
formity orientation. Indonesians as a whole have a high affiliation 
need, like to please each other and do not like to openly hurt other's 
feelings. In addition, Indonesian society is strongly deferential to 
the senior partner i.n any hierarchical relationship. Thus, it was in 
thi.s manner that Sukarno was able to rationalize his unholy alliance 
of the PKI and the military in the days before GESTAPU. While out-
siders might have viewed the alliance as potentially explosive, in 
Sukarno's own mind, it was simply the result of the natural course 
of events. In the long run, it was his farsightedness that would prove 
fatal. 
To this deep-seated Javanism, Dahm adds a third factor: 
Sukarno's unbending devotion to his conception of what was right for 
Indonesia. It must be remembered that at no time did Sukarno ever 
openly seek self-aggrandizement. To his own way of thinking, every 
rupiah spent in Indonesia was money spent for the glorification of the 
state and its people. His speeches redound with praise for the masses 
and their struggles to achieve a better way of life. He honestly felt 
that the actions he took were beneficial to the masses of Indonesia. 
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Yet he was so far from reality in his actions. As Dahm 
comments, 
There is a tragic greatness in a man so possessed of his 
own rightness and self-righteousness, so impervious to the 
harsh truths of Indonesian political life. From his earliest 
days as a political activist, Sukarno insisted that nationalism, 
Marxism, and Islam were one. And so, in a sense, they or 
rather what he assumed and proclaimed each of them to be, 
were by his own Javanese light. 113 
Just as the wahyu shone down on the ancient Mataram princes, so in 
his own convictions, did it reflect on Sukarno. And, just as the 
extinguishing of the light signaled the end of the princes reign, so 
also with Sukarno, Great Leader of the Revolution. 
In the opening chapter of this essay it was stated that the 
research would not concern itself only with the events in Indonesia 
but also the larger question of political change in developing societies. 
It would appear that some assessment of the significance of the 
Indonesian experience would be in order. The questions are these: 
What are the lessons of GEST APU and its a~ermath? More 
specifically, what is the significance of the displacement of Sukarno 
for students of developing societies? Finally, can the Indonesian 
experience provide new insights into the problem of political change 
in developing societies? The conclusion to this essay will address 
itself to these important considerations. 
113Ibid., p. viii. 
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The Indonesian experience once again reaffirmed the fact 
that political change does not occur within a vacuum with all the 
variables clearly identified and understood. Indeed, the events in 
Indonesia showed the definite need to explore and comprehend the 
socio-cultural environment from which the political system evolved. 
Indonesia's political system developed for specific reasons unique to 
its cultural heritage. If the researcher truly wants to get an accurate 
picture of any society, he must be aware that cultural patterns do 
play an important role in the politics of that society. For Indonesia, 
the primary consideration was the central role of Java in the contem-
porary environment. It was the awareness of this cultural heritage 
that influenced all the agents in the drama of political change that 
unfolded after September 30 -October 1, 1965. It is not surprising 
to learn that both of the major actors i.n the Indonesian scenario 
(Sukarno and Suharto) were extremely conscious of their Javanese 
backgrounds. Whatever the case, GESTAPU has proved the need to 
study all aspects of a social situation when attempting to comprehend 
bios politicos. 
GESTAPU also proved that even in the most authoritarian 
settings, the masses do play a significant role in establishing and 
maintaining the legitimacy of the political leadership. When the mood 
of the masses was favorable to him, Sukarno was widely praised and 
supported. However, as the revelations of political intrigue were 
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made public by the trials, the mood of the masses began to change 
until their support was withdrawn altogether in March, 1967. The 
ability to recognize the mood of "the people" and to act in accordance 
with their wishes is a difficult political task indeed. 
Sukarno had become so involved in manipulating the symbols 
of power that he lost sight of their purpose: to insure the best possible 
environment for as many citizens as possible by shielding them from 
the excesses of government. He saw political legitimacy not as a 
rational tool to be used in aiding the masses but as an emotional 
instrument to feed his self-image. By losing sight of his authority, 
Sukarno failed to recognize the shi~ing mood of his subjects as they 
regarded their government. Worse yet, when he did finally recognize 
the people's true sentiments, he failed to readjust his strategies to 
accommodate the new situation. Instead of coming down to the level 
of his citizens, Sukarno sought to wrap himself in the aura of psuedo-
legitimacy that his symbols of power had created for him. Instead of 
coming closer, Sukarno retreated. In contrast, Suharto was able to 
measure this sentiment of the people. This ability to properly analyze 
the situation was the decisive factor in alleviating Indonesia's crisis 
in political leadership. 
Similarly, the events in Indonesia teach the need to be 
persistent but patient in attempting to resolve a crisis in political 
leadership. The military knew that an open challenge to Sukarno's 
~-------------------""""""·"" .. -~......, .. ,.,...,,,.. 
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legitimacy in the early post-GESTAPU days would have ended i.n their 
defeat because of Sukarno's pre-eminent position in Indonesian society. 
Even while many of the politically elite groups in Indonesia had suffered 
under the repressive reign of Sukarno's rule, there was still a tendency 
to prefer him over a military, that at least in their minds, had seized 
the symbols of legitimacy without just cause and was now proceeding 
to create a new legitimacy by perverting the old insti.tuti.ons for their 
own ends. Even though Sukarno had suppressed them, the political 
elite still felt a sense of commonality with him; they were all poli-
ticians. Such a sense of "oneness" was missing when the military 
assumed effective control of the political system. To the political 
elite, the military was a curious interloper who sought to use their 
monopoly of weapons to create an unnatural state of affairs. 
Accordingly, the military conceded Sukarno's dominance in 
those first days and were willing to bide their ti.me until such an oppor-
tunity to directly confront him was feasible. Yet the military did not 
sit idly by while Sukarno gained even greater legitimacy. In the days 
after GESTAPU the military tacitly approved the student attacks on 
Sukarno by failing to control the cro\NCls, claiming a lack of authority 
to do so. This i.n turn forced Sukarno to give them the necessary 
power to cope with the situation. In addition, the military used 
indirect means (i.e., the trials) to undermine Sukarno's legitimacy 
to govern. As a result, when the ti.me for confrontation arrived, the 
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military had garnered enough support to displace the President. 
There is little doubt that if the military had tri.ed to force Sukarno 
from office immediately a~er GESTAPU that they would have failed 
in their attempt. Doing so would have simply established the i.mage 
of Sukarno as the symbol of the consti.tuti.onally legal order bei.ng 
supplanted by a dissident military. By exercising restrai.nt and dis-
cretion, the mi.li.tary allowed Sukarno to undermine his own position, 
thereby making the transfer of political authority a desi.rable and 
necessary action. Sukarno was made to appear the aggressor, not 
the military. The implication of the Indonesian experience is clear: 
do not try to challenge legitimacy with illegitimacy. Symbolic 
manifestations of authority make an indelible imprint on a man's 
mind. Use the symbols of authority when confronting authority. Do 
not challenge simply to challenge. Manipulate the established symbols 
to create an aura of legitimacy. Only in this manner will the dis-
placement of a government be acceptable to its constituents. 
The final lesson of the Indonesian experience is an obvious 
one: no leader is invincible to political change. No matter how 
charismatic or dogmatic a political figure may be, he is still ultimately 
accountable to his constituents in one way or another. Sukarno --
Bung Karno, Great Father of the Revolution, President for Life -- how 
secure and inscrutable he appeared to be. Yet, perhaps it was this 
state of mind that brought about his demise. Perhaps Sukarno had 
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grown too complacent in his relationship with his people. Perhaps he 
had allowed himself to become isolated from the true feelings of the 
society in whose name he governed. Indeed, perhaps Sukarno 
believed that he was the Ratu Adil of the ancient Javanese prophecies. 
One thing is certain, however. The winds of political change were 
blowing in Indonesia after October 1, 1965. One man (Suharto) was 
able to accurately gauge its intensity. Another man (Sukarno) was 
not. Whether "Pak Harto" and his New Order will succeed is still 
unclear at this point. Only time will tell the answer. 
r 
POSTSCRIPT 
General Suharto has sought to create a broad basis of 
support throughout Indonesian society since assuming power in the 
wake of GESTAPU. A major blot on his record, however, has been 
the government's inability (or unwillingness) to rehabilitate the 
associates of the coup participants. As a result, this failure at 
reconstruction has caused some segments of Indonesian society to 
doubt the validity and sincerity of President Suharto's proposed Orba 
(New Order). 
As late as June, 1970 many of the minor participants of 
the coup attempt were still being detained by the government. The 
majority of the prisoners were being held as members, supporters, 
or "associates" of the outlawed PKI. Amnesty International reported 
in 1970 that there were 116,000 political prisoners still being held in 
Indonesia. 114 The Indonesian government responded to this charge 
114Herbert Feith, "Indonesia: Blot on the New Order," 
New Republic 15 (April 13, 1968), p. 17. 
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by saying that the figure was closer to 55,000. The exact figure will 
probably never be known. 115 
The detainees are classified into three general categories: 
Group A includes the hard-core prisoners, those 
reportedly incapable of rehabilitation. 
Group B prisoners are those whose fates have not yet 
been decided by the mi.l itary tribunals hearing 
their appeals. 
Group C individuals are those whose involvement in 
GEST APU has been proven but whom the govern-
ment views as minimum security risks. 
The overwhelming majority of those persons now incarcerated are 
classified in the Group C category. 
The conditions in the camps are extremely poor. Prisoners 
constantly suffer from cruelty and harassment at the hands of the 
military guards. More importantly, the prisoners suffer from a 
chronic lack of food and medical facilities. O~en, prisoners receive 
nothing more than a thin gruel of wheat and a few stalks of bajem 
(spinach) once a day. In spite of the bad conditions, however, most 
-~ 
115In recent years, the issue of the prisoners has become 
a dead letter. Interviews with government officials provide no new 
insights into the future plans for rehabilitation or even the number of 
persons still being held. 
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prisoners maintain a high sense of self-respect. In the long run, this 
sense of personal worth may prove to be decisive in light of their 
extreme deprivation. 
The prospects for the release of these prisoners is not 
bright at the present time. For one thing, there exists a great fear 
on the part of the government that if these prisoners were released 
into the general society, they might attempt to reorganize the PKI. 
As one government official has stated, "We have learned that it does 
not pay to be lenient. These communists are acting docile now, but 
they are sly and they are clever. 11116 As long as attitudes such as 
this prevail, it does not appear that release will be forthcoming. 
There is also apprehension as to how the general populace 
would accept these former PKI intimates. Many Indonesians still 
harbor great animosity toward the PKI because of the post-GESTAPU 
purges. As one young man, whose brother was killed by the PKI has 
said, "I know who did it. I am waiting for them to come back. If the 
communists come back to OU r town, we Will have to ki 11 them . 11 l l ? 
Comments like this are heard throughout Indonesia. 
116Ibid. , p. 19. 
117New York Times, November 16, 1969, p. 4. 
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In August, 1969 the Indonesian government outlined a plan 
to send 2,500 Group C prisoners and their families to the deserted 
island of Buru. By the end of 1971, however, less than 1,000 
detainees had been relocated. It appears at this time that the 
problem of the political prisoners will remain a major blemish on 
the image of Suharto's "New Order" for many years to come. 
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APPENDIX 
APPENDIX 
DECREE NO. 1 
ON THE FORMATION OF THE REVOLUTIONARY 
COUNCIL OF INDONESIA 
I. For the sake of the safety of the State of the Republic of Indonesia, 
for the sake of safeguarding implementation of Pantjasila and the 
whole of the Pantja Azimat of the Revolution, for the sake of the 
safety of the Army and of the Armed Services in general, in the 
middle of the night of Thursday, 30th September 1965, a cleaning-
up operation was carried out in the Capital of the Republic of 
Indonesia, Djarkarta, against members of the self-styled Council 
of Generals, which had planned a Coup just before Armed Forces 
Day on 5th October 1965. A number of Generals have been 
arrested, the means of communication and the other vital objects 
in the Capital have fallen fully into the power of the 30th September 
Movement. The 30th September Movement is a movement solely 
confined to the body of the Army to put an end to the arbitrary 
deeds of the Generals who are Members of the Council of Generals 
and of the other officers who are accomplices and sympathisers of 
the Council of Generals. This Movement is assisted by armed 
troops outside the Army. 
II. In order to facilitate follow-up activities of the 30th September 
1965 action, the Leadership of the 30th September Movement will 
form the Revolutionary Council of Indonesia, the members of which 
will be composed of civilians and military persons who support the 
30th September Movement without reserve. For the time being, 
pending general elections for the Madjeli.s Permusjaratan Rakjat 
in conformity with the 1945 Constitution, the Revolutionary Council 
of Indonesia is the source of all authority in the state of the 
Republic of Indonesia. The Revolutionary Council is the instru-
ment for the whole of the Indonesian nation to realize Pantja Si.la 
and the whole of the Pantja Azimat of the Revolution. The 
Revolutionary Council of Indonesia will be represented in its day-
to-day activities by the Presidium of the Council, which will be 
composed of the Commander and the Deputy Commanders of the 
30th September Movement. 
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III. With the falling of all the authority of the State to the Revolutionary 
Council of Indonesia, the Dwikora Cabinet automatically has the 
status of being decommissioned. Until the formation of a new 
Cabinet by the Revolutionary Council of Indonesia, the former 
Ministers have the obligation to carry out routine tasks, to guard 
orderliness in their respective Departments, are forbidden to 
appoint new civil servants and are forbidden to take steps that can 
have wide-spread consequences. All former Ministers are obliged 
to account for their responsibilities to the Revolutionary Council of 
Indonesia and specifically to the new Ministers who will be appointed 
by the Revolutionary Council of Indonesia. 
IV. As the regional instruments of the Revolutionary Council of 
Indonesia, Provincial Revolutionary Councils (maxi.mum of 25 
persons), Kabupaten Revolutionary Councils (maximum 15 persons), 
Ketjamatan Revolutionary Councils (maximum 10 persons) and 
Village Revolutionary Councils (maximum 7 persons) will be set up, 
composed of civilians and military persons who support the 30th 
September Movement without reserve. These Regional Revolu-
tionary Councils are the highest authority for the region concerned, 
and the work of those in the Provinces and Kabupaten will be 
assisted by their respective Day-to-Day Administrative Bodies, 
whi. lst those in the Ketjamatan and the Villages will be assisted by 
the leaders of the local branch of the National Front who are persons 
supporting the 30th September Movement without reserve. 
V. The Presidium of the Revolutionary Council of Indonesia consists 
of the Commander and the Deputy Commanders of the 30th September 
Movement. The Commander and Deputy Commanders of the 30th 
September Movement are the Chairman and Vice-Chairmen of the 
Revolutionary Council of Indonesia. 
VI. Immediately after the formation of the Regional Revolutionary 
Councils, the Chairmen of the relevant Revolutionary Councils must 
report to the Revolutionary Council of the next higher level as to 
the complete composition of the membership of the Council. 
Provincial Revolutionary Councils must obtain written ratification 
from the Presidium of the Revolutionary Council of Indonesia. 
Kabupaten Revolutionary Councils must obtain written ratification 
from the Provincial Revolutionary Council, and the Ketjamatan and 
Village Revolutionary Councils must obtain written ratification from 
the Kabupaten Revo luti.onary Councils . 
Djakarta, 1st October 1965 
THE 30th SEPTEMBER MOVEMENT COMMAND 
Commander: 
Deputy Commander: 
Deputy Commander: 
Deputy Commander: 
Deputy Commander: 
Lt-Colonel Untung. 
Brig-General Supardjo. 
Air Lt-Colonel Heru. 
Sea Co lone l Sunardi • 
Adjunct Senior Commissioner of 
Pol ice Anwas • 
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PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF INDONESIA 
ANNOUNCEMENT (OCTOBER 1, 1965) 
We, the President/Supreme Commander of the Armed 
Forces of the Republic of Indonesia/Great Leader of the Indonesian 
Revolution announce the following: 
1. We, the President/Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces/ 
Great Leader of the Revolution herewith announce: That I am in 
good health and that I continue exercising the State-leadership, 
and leading the Revolution. That temporarily, the leadership of 
the Armed Forces of the Republic of Indonesia is directly in the 
hands of the President/Supreme Commander of the Armed 
Forces of the Republic of Indonesia. 
That in order to implement the daily tasks within the Army, 
Major General of the Army, Pranoto Reksosamudro, 3rd 
Assistant to the Minister/Army Chief, has been temporarily 
appointed. 
2. To the entire Armed Forces of the Republic of Indonesia, I order 
to again increase their vigilance and to remain at their respective 
posts and only move on orders. 
3. I order to the entire People to remain calm, to increase their 
vigilance and to maintain their National oneness and unity as 
compact as possible. 
Djakarta, October 1, 1965 
PRESIDENT /SUPREME COMMANDER/GREAT LEADER 
OF THE REVOLUTION/MANDATARY OF THE MPRS 
sgd. 
SUKARNO 
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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY 
ANNOUNCEMENT NO. 002/PENG/PUS/1965 
It is hereby announced that: 
1 . An understanding, cooperation and determination has been 
resulted by the Army, Navy and the Police Force to overcome 
the counter-revolutionary deeds committed by a movement cal led 
"Gerakan 30 September" (September-30 Movement). 
2. By establishing what they call "The Indonesian Revolutionary 
Council" and by declaring the DWIKORA Cabinet as demissionary, 
it became obvious that they are counter-revolutionaries commit-
ting a coup against the President/Great Leader of the Revolution 
and having kidnapped several high-ranking Army Officers. 
3. The public is asked to be calm, alert and watchful. 
Djakarta, October 1, 1965 
TEMPORARY ARMY LEADERSHIP 
sgd. 
SOEHARTO 
Major General of the Army 
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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY 
ANNOUNCEMENT NO. 027 /PENG/PUS/1965 
1 . On October 1, 1965, things happened in Djakarta as the result of 
a counter-revolutionary action calling themselves "September 30 
Movement"; 
2. They kidnapped the following high ranking officers of the Army: 
1 . Lieutenant General A. Yani; 
2. Major General Suprapto; 
3. Major General S. Parman; 
4. Major General Harjono M. T.; 
5. Brigadier General D. I. Pandjaitan; 
6. Bri.gadi.er General Sutojo Siswomihardjo. 
3. They had been able to force and use the R.R. I. (Radio Republi.k 
Indonesia) and the Head Office of Telecommunications; 
4. President Sukarno and the Minister of Defense and Security, 
General A.H. Nasution, were safe and sound; 
5. The Army's leadership is in the hands of Major General Soeharto 
for the ti.me being. 
6. The general situation had been controlled and security measures 
were still being taken. The public is asked to remain calm and 
do their dai.ly tasks as usual. 
Djakarta, October 1, 1965 
TEMPORARY ARMY LEADERSHIP 
sgd. 
SOEHARTO 
Major General of the Army 
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PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF INDONESIA 
ORDER (FEBRUARY 20, 1967) 
I. Considering: 
1 • This present stage of the Revolution, and the national and 
international political situation as well; 
2. The Order of the Day of the Supreme Commander of the 
Armed Forces/President/Great Leader of the Revolution, 
on March 8, 1966; 
II. In View of: 
1. The necessity to create an atmosphere of calm and stability 
for the Government, and the course of the Revolution. 
2. It is deemed necessary to guarantee the oneness between 
the Great Leader of the Revolution, the Armed Forces and 
the People, in order to maintain the authority and the 
leadership of the President/Supreme Commander/Great 
Leader of the Revolution and all his teachings. 
III. Has resolved/ordered: 
To order: Lieutenant General Soeharto, Minister/Commander 
in Chief of the Army, on behalf of the President/Supreme 
Commander/Great Leader of the Revolution: 
To take all necessary steps to guarantee security and calm 
and the stability of the running of the Government and the 
course of the Revolution, while securing the personal safety 
of and the authority of the Great Leader of the Revolution. 
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IV. To convey this announcement with fullest sense of responsibility, 
to the entire People of Indonesia and to the MPRS. May God 
Almighty protect the People of Indonesia in implementing their 
ideals in realizing a just and prosperous society, based on 
Pantja Si la. 
Djakarta, February 20, 1967 
PRESIDENT /SUPREME COMMANDER/GREAT LEADER 
OF THE REVOLUTION/MANDATARY OF MPRS 
sgd. 
SUKARNO 
PROVISIONAL CONSULTATIVE PEOPLE'S CONGRESS 
OF THE REPUBLIC OF INDONESIA 
DECREE NO. XXXIII/MPRS/1 967 
Considering: 
a. That the address entitled "Nawaksara" as a whole, that was 
delivered by the President/Mandatary of MPRS to the MPRS 
on 22nd June 1966 and the letter of the President/Mandatary 
of MPRS, No. 01 /Pres/1967 of 10th January concerning the 
Supplement to the "Nawaksara" address, falls short of 
fulfilling the hopes of the people in general and especially the 
members of the MPRS, since it does not clearly contain and 
account for responsibility as to the policy of the President in 
regard to the counter-revolutionary rebellion of the 
"September 30 Movement"/PKI and its epilogue, the economic 
deterioration and decline of morals; 
b. That the President/Mandatary of MPRS has transferred the 
power of Government to the Executor of MPRS Decree No. 
IX/MPRS/1966 as laid down in the announcement of the 
President/Mandatary of MPRS on 20th February 1967; 
c. That, based on the written Report of the Commander of the 
Command for the Restoration of Order and Security/Executor 
of MPRS Decree No. IX/MPRS/1966 in his letter No. :R-032/ 
1967 on 1st February 1967, supplemented with the report before 
the Special Session of the MPRS on 7th March 1967, the MPRS 
is of the opinion that there are indications that President Sukarno 
has conducted a policy which indirectly benefi.tted the 
"September 30 Movement"/PKI and has given protection to 
leaders of the ''September 30 Movement"/PKI; 
In View of: 
1 • The DPR-GR Resolution and Memorandum of 9th and 23rd 
February 1967; 
2. The address of the Chairman of the MPRS at the opening session 
of the Special Session of the MPRS 1967; 
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3. The address of the Chairman of the DPR-GR at the opening session 
of the Special Session of the MPRS; 
4. The Government Statement before the DPR-GR on the 4th of March 
1967; 
5. The address-report of the Commander of the Command for the 
Restoration of Order and Security/Executor of MPRS Decree No. 
IX/MPRS/1966 before the Special Session of the MPRS, on 7th 
March 1967. 
With due regard to: 
1 • The Preamble to the 1945 Constitution, the 1945 Constitution and 
its Elucidation; 
2. Decision of the Leadership of the MPRS No. 13/B/1967 concerning 
the rejection of the Supplement to the "Nawaksara" address. 
Having heard: 
The deliberation at the Special Session of MPRS from 7th March 
to 12th March 1967 inclusive. 
Has resolved: 
To decree: 
The Decree concerning the Revocation of Government Power from 
President Sukarno. 
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CHAPTER I 
Article 1 
Declare that President Sukarno has not fulfilled his 
constitutional obligations as a good Mandatary ought to do towards 
the MPRS which has given hi.m the mandate as stipulated in the 1945 
Constitution. 
Article 2 
Declare that President Sukarno has not executed the policy 
of the State and the Decrees of the MPRS, as a good Mandatary is 
obliged to do towards the MPRS which has given him the mandate 
as provided for by the 1945 Constitution. 
Article 3 
To prohibit President Sukarno from conducting political 
activities till the general elections and, as from the coming 
into effect of this Decision, to revoke the MPRS mandate from 
President Sukarno and all powers of Government as stipulated in 
the 1 945 Constitution. 
Article 4 
To sanction the coming into effect of MPRS Decree No. 
XV /MPRS/1966, and to appoint General Soeharto, Executor of 
MPRS Decree No. IX/MPRS/1966, as Acting President based 
on Article 8 of the 1945 Constitution, until the election of a new 
President by the Madjelis Permusjawaratan Rakjat as a result of 
general elections. 
Article 5 
The Acting President shall obey and is responsible to the 
Madjelis Permusjawaratan Rakjat (Sementara). 
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CHAPTER II 
Article 6 
Decide that the further judicial settlement which concerns 
Dr. Ir. Sukarno be implemented i.n accordance with the stipulations 
of Law i.n the context of upholding law and justice; entrust its imple-
mentation to the Acting President. 
CHAPTER III 
Article 7 
This Decree comes into effect at the date of its sanctioning 
and shall have retroactive force as from 22nd February 1967. 
Decreed at: Djakarta 
On March 12, 1967 
PROVISIONAL MADJELIS PERMUSJAWARATAN RAKJAT 
REPUBLIC OF INDONESIA 
Chairman 
sgd. 
Dr. A.H. NASUTION 
General of the Army 
Vice Chairman 
sgd. 
OSA MALIK! 
Vice Chairman 
sgd. 
M. SIREGAR 
Clari Fi.cation 
Vice Chairman 
sgd. 
H.M. SUBCHAN Z.E. 
Vice Chairman 
sgd. 
MASHUDI 
Major General of the Army 
The power of Government as meant here is understood to mean 
as is stipulated in the 1945 Constitution and its Elucidation, so that in 
accordance with mentioned stipulations, President Sukarno has been 
substituted by General Soeharto, Executor of MPRS Decree No. 
IX/MPRS/1966 as Acting President. 
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